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BEYOND THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL: 
 EQUALITY DIRECTIVES IN AMERICAN LAW 
 
OLATUNDE C.A. JOHNSON* 
 
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, VOL. 87, 2012 
American civil rights regulation is generally understood as relying on private 
enforcement in courts, rather than imposing positive duties on state actors to further 
equity goals. This Article argues that this dominant conception of American civil rights 
regulation is incomplete. Rather, American civil rights regulation also contains a set of 
“equality directives,” whose emergence and reach in recent years have gone 
unrecognized in the commentary. These federal-level equality directives use 
administrative tools of conditioned spending, policymaking, and oversight powerfully to 
promote substantive inclusion with regard to race, ethnicity, language, and disability. 
These directives move beyond the constraints of the standard private attorney general 
regime of antidiscrimination law. They engage broader tools of state power, just as 
recent Supreme Court decisions have constrained private enforcement. They require 
states to take proactive, front-end, affirmative measures, rather than relying on 
backward-looking, individually driven complaints. And these directives move beyond a 
narrow focus on individual bias to address current, structural barriers to equality. As a 
result, these directives are profoundly transforming the operation and design of 
programs at the state and local levels. They are engaging both traditional civil rights 
groups and community-based groups in innovative and promising new forms of 
advocacy and implementation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
States and localities receiving federal transportation funds must 
include minority groups in their planning, assess the racial impacts of their 
programs, and adopt nondiscriminatory alternatives.1 State and local 
 
 
1
 See 49 C.F.R. pt. 21 (2011) (imposing requirements of nondiscrimination and proactive 
  
governments that receive federal housing funds must promote integration 
on the basis of race, ethnicity, and disability in their programs by analyzing 
barriers to fair housing and removing those barriers.2 Federal agencies 
administering programs related to food, nutrition, forestry, and agriculture 
must conduct a “civil rights impact analysis” to ensure that minorities and 
people with disabilities fairly benefit from federally funded programs.3 
Such agencies must also take steps to mitigate any adverse impacts on 
these groups.4 Federal agencies must take affirmative steps to provide 
persons with limited English proficiency (LEP) “meaningful access” to 
federally funded programs.5 
These statutes and regulations do not fit into the classic conception of 
modern American civil rights law. Commentators have come to understand 
 
inclusion on federal grantees); FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., CIRCULAR FTA C 
4702.1A, TITLE VI AND TITLE VI-DEPENDENT GUIDELINES FOR FEDERAL TRANSIT 
ADMINISTRATION RECIPIENTS II-1 (2007) [hereinafter FTA C 4702.1A], available at 
http://www.fta.dot.gov/documents/Title_VI_Circular_4702.1A.pdf (listing the following among 
the objectives of the regulation: (1) ensuring access to transportation by all groups, (2) preventing 
racial, ethnic, and class disparities in the environmental effects of transportation, (3) promoting 
full and fair participation in transportation decisionmaking by all affected populations, and (4) 
ensuring access to programs and activities by persons with limited English proficiency). These 
provisions, which apply to the Federal Department of Transportation (DOT) and its state and 
local grantees, implement Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) 
(prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin in federally funded 
programs). 
 
2
 See 24 C.F.R. § 570.487(b) (2012) (requiring, inter alia, that local governments receiving 
community development block grants certify that they will “affirmatively further fair housing,” 
(AFFH) conduct an analysis of “impediments to fair housing choice within the State,” and take 
“appropriate actions to overcome the effects of any impediments identified through that 
analysis”); see also 24 C.F.R. §§ 91.225(a), .325(a), .425(a) (2012) (imposing a duty on recipients 
of certain community planning and development grants to “affirmatively further fair housing,” 
including requiring analysis of “impediments to fair housing choice”). Additional guidance from 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) requires that jurisdictions participate 
with citizens to develop their plans to further fair housing, detail fair housing goals, and report on 
steps undertaken to meet those goals. See 1 OFFICE OF FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., FAIR HOUSING PLANNING GUIDE, at 2-5 to -7 (1996) 
[hereinafter FAIR HOUSING PLANNING GUIDE], available at 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/images/fhpg.pdf (providing an overview of fair housing 
planning requirements for state and local grantees). These directives implement section 3608 of 
the Fair Housing Act (FHA), which requires HUD to administer programs “in a manner 
affirmatively to further the policies of [the Fair Housing Act].” 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2006); 
see also § 3608(d) (requiring the same of all federal departments and agencies). 
 
3
 See OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., DR 4300-4, CIVIL RIGHTS IMPACT 
ANALYSIS 1 (2003), available at http://www.ocio.usda.gov/directives/doc/DR4300-4.pdf 
(summarizing the purpose and requirements of a civil rights impact analysis). 
 
4
 See id. 
 
5
 Exec. Order No. 13,166, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,121 (Aug. 16, 2000); DOJ Policy Guidance, 
Enforcement of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—National Origin Discrimination 
Against Persons with Limited English Proficiency, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,123 (Aug. 16, 2000). 
  
American civil rights statutes as achieving their public ends 
(nondiscrimination, equity, and integration) by delegating private parties to 
serve as enforcers through individual litigation.6 Political development 
scholars highlight American civil rights law’s emphasis on private 
enforcement, contrasting it with European models of civil rights regulation 
that place greater reliance on the state’s administrative apparatus to 
advance equity.7 Unlike Europe or the United Kingdom, they claim, the 
American state does not impose positive duties on state actors to further 
equity goals.8 For scholars of American political development, this facet of 
American civil rights law is consistent with the “weak” fragmented nature 
of the American state: In the formative period of civil rights regulation, the 
United States consciously rejected centralized, bureaucratic forms of civil 
rights governance and instead relied on a fragmented system of private 
enforcement through courts.9 
This dominant narrative is not inaccurate—particularly as compared to 
European models of governance—but it is incomplete. This Article shows 
that American civil rights regulation also operates by placing a set of 
 
 
6
 See, e.g., Robert C. Lieberman, Private Power and American Bureaucracy: The EEOC and 
Civil Rights Enforcement (Jan. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the New York 
University Law Review) (documenting this view); see also SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION 
STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 3–4 (2010) (describing civil 
rights statutes like Title VII as entailing a “legislative choice to rely upon private litigation in 
statutory implementation”). 
 
7
 See generally, e.g., Robert C. Lieberman, Weak State, Strong Policy: Paradoxes of Race 
Policy in the United States, Great Britain, and France, 16 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 138 (2002) 
(contrasting American, British, and French approaches to civil rights law). 
 
8
 See Julie Chi-hye Suk, Antidiscrimination Law in the Administrative State, 2006 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 405, 438 (contrasting U.K. law to U.S. law, which “imposes no such [affirmative] duty on 
public authorities”); Leland Ware, A Comparative Analysis of Unconscious and Institutional 
Discrimination in the United States and Britain, 36 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 89, 140, 146–48, 
150–51 (2007) (describing the positive duties imposed on public authorities under U.K. law and 
contrasting these with the American emphasis on antidiscrimination and remedying harm). These 
comparisons arise from examinations of the United Kingdom’s 2000 Amendments to the Race 
Relations Act of 1976, which impose a “general statutory duty” on public authorities to eliminate 
unlawful discrimination, promote equality of opportunity, and promote good relations between 
different racial groups. Race Relations (Amendment) Act, 2000, c. 34, § 2 (Eng.); see also Suk, 
supra, at 436–37 (describing the U.K. Amendments and similar European Union and Northern 
Ireland laws that rely on “mainstreaming,” which “requires equality to be . . . ‘taken into account 
in every policy and executive decision’” (quoting SANDRA FREDMAN, DISCRIMINATION LAW 176 
(2002))). 
 
9
 See ROBERT C. LIEBERMAN, SHAPING RACE POLICY 149 (2005) (comparing employment 
discrimination policy in the United States to France and Great Britain, and finding that “[i]n the 
United States, fragmented and decentralized politics produced a fragmented and individualistic 
enforcement regime”). For a discussion of American reliance on adversarial rather than 
bureaucratic methods of policy implementation in civil rights and other areas, describing the rise 
of litigation and “private attorneys general” as responses to the fragmented American state, see 
ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM 15–16, 46–47 (2001). 
  
positive duties on state actors to promote equality and inclusion. I analyze 
statutes and regulations that I call equality directives. I show how these 
directives’ goals and functions differ from those that emphasize individual 
enforcement or redress of private claims. Beyond completing our 
understanding of civil rights law, I argue that these equality directives 
deserve greater attention from academic commentators and advocates 
interested in promoting equity. For one, recent Supreme Court decisions 
have limited private enforcement of civil rights statutes and tightened the 
procedural rules for pursuing claims in federal court,10 which strains the 
private attorney general model upon which civil rights advocates 
historically have depended. In addition, equality directives can serve as 
powerful tools for moving beyond a focus on courts and on the limited goal 
of antidiscrimination dominant in traditional civil rights law. To address 
inequality today, legal and regulatory interventions must address more than 
bias. These interventions should engage state regulatory and programmatic 
power, not just judicial power. Through the use of spending, policymaking, 
and oversight, a regime of equality directives can counter the limitations of 
adjudication-based civil rights regimes. States and local authorities are 
already implementing these directives by taking proactive, affirmative 
measures to redesign transit, housing, and other services in ways that allow 
greater participation of previously excluded groups and in ways that 
reshape the structural landscape that has previously sustained inequality. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I argues that the standard 
conception of civil rights law ignores equality directives. The typical 
account of American civil rights law identifies two enforcement regimes: 
(1) a private attorney general model and (2) a public enforcement model 
understood as either prosecution by public agencies in court or claim 
resolution through administrative adjudication.11 Part I argues that a third 
civil rights regulatory regime exists: one centered on advancing civil rights 
norms through formal and informal forms of administrative power. My 
prime examples are Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act12 and provisions 
 
 
10
 For example, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 556–57 (2007), moved away from 
the liberal federal pleading regime of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), and required that, to 
survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs plead enough “factual matter” to state a “plausible” claim 
for relief. Subsequently, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–80 (2009), applied Twombly’s 
“plausibility” standard to constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 
11
 See, e.g., FARHANG, supra note 6, at 4–5, 21–22, 34 (discussing the congressional 
mobilization of private litigants to enforce Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 
rejection of administrative adjudication models); Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement 
of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401 (1998) 
(distinguishing between private enforcement by litigants in courts and government prosecution of 
claims). 
 
12
 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) (forbidding discrimination by federal grantees on the basis 
  
of the Fair Housing Act that require federal agencies and grantees to take 
affirmative steps to further fair housing goals.13 As Part I shows, these 
statutes and regulations unleash a range of administrative tools, including 
conditioned spending and formal and informal forms of regulatory 
oversight and guidance, to promote equity and inclusion in federal-state 
programs. Largely because of the institutional choice these statutes 
present—a bureaucratic form of enforcement disfavored by most civil 
rights commentators14—these statutes and regulations are given scant 
attention in the civil rights literature and in the practice and development of 
civil rights law.15 In the first Part, I introduce these statutes and related 
regulatory actions that impose positive and pervasive duties on state actors 
to promote equity. 
Part II shows why this third model is particularly salient for promoting 
equity and substantive inclusion today. Much of what commentators find 
insufficient about the traditional civil rights regime—its limitations in 
addressing disparate impacts,16 its fixation on formalized aspects of 
discrimination and bias,17 its impotence in the face of embedded, 
institutionalized forms of racial exclusion18—can be addressed through 
equality directives. Equality directives do more than combat discrimination 
 
of race, color, or national origin). 
 
13
 See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2006) (requiring HUD to administer its programs and 
activities “in a manner affirmatively to further the policies of [the Fair Housing Act]”); § 3608(d) 
(requiring the same of all federal departments and agencies). 
 
14
 See infra notes 106–114 and accompanying text (describing skepticism among civil rights 
commentators about agency capacity to enforce civil rights). 
 
15
 For instance, when Congress strengthened the severely flawed FHA in 1988, it 
strengthened the administrative enforcement apparatus (through agency prosecutions and 
adjudications) and the private enforcement apparatus. See infra text accompanying notes 92–96. 
But Congress failed even to discuss mechanisms for strengthening what I would suggest is 
another pillar of the Act—the duties it requires of federal, state, and local governments. 
 
16
 See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 
734, 738–43 (2006) (discussing the practical failures and limitations of Title VII’s conception of 
discrimination after conducting empirical analysis); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No 
Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 
1135–37 (1997) (discussing the limitations of the Constitution’s construction of discrimination). 
 
17
 See R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 879–96 (2004) (proposing an emphasis on “racial stigma” to counter 
limitations of current equal protection jurisprudence); Glenn C. Loury, Discrimination in the 
Post-Civil Rights Era: Beyond Market Interactions, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1998, at 117, 118–19 
(urging a move away from a focus on discrimination towards a focus on social capital and other 
mechanisms that lead to economic disparities). 
 
18
 See Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias 
Matter? Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, 1113–14 (2009) (doubting 
that racial bias “explains all or even most of the racial injustices that plague our society” and 
arguing that “many decisions and practices that adversely affect racial minorities do not fit neatly 
within the conventional antidiscrimination framework”). 
  
and bias: They also seek to promote economic and other opportunities, full 
participation in government-funded programs, and social inclusion for 
excluded groups. 
Part III examines equality directives in two areas that are particularly 
central to promoting opportunity and inclusion today: housing and 
transportation. These case studies show how equality directives emerged at 
the federal level. Further, these case studies reveal equality directives in 
operation, showing how these directives allow underserved groups to 
participate in planning and policymaking, engage in front-end redesign of 
programs and practices, and spur the adoption of practices and policies that 
promote economic and social opportunity. 
In Part IV, I examine the key challenges posed by equality directives, 
and the steps that government actors and private groups should undertake 
to more fully implement this emergent regime. 
I 
BEYOND ADJUDICATIVE ENFORCEMENT 
Dominant accounts of civil rights statutes generally describe two types 
of civil rights enforcement, private and public, both of which center on the 
resolution of claims through adjudicative or quasi-adjudicative processes. 
The first—and the most discussed in the academic commentary—is the 
private attorney general model, which emphasizes enforcement by 
individuals in courts, via individual or class action litigation. The second is 
the public enforcement model, which involves the prosecution of claims in 
courts and administrative tribunals. Commentators have described 
American civil rights law as a struggle between the two, with private 
enforcement emerging as the dominant, favored model.19 After presenting 
these models, this Part argues that these dominant narratives omit a third 
type of civil rights regulation: statutes and regulations that operate by 
imposing a set of proactive duties on public actors in the administrative 
state. Several civil rights statutes have included this form of regulation, but 
it remains largely overlooked by commentators. In recent years, a set of 
regulatory actions to enforce these statutes has instituted an American 
version of “equality directives”20—a regime that differs in form and 
operation from the dominant forms of civil rights regulation. 
 
 
19
 See infra notes 52–56 and accompanying text (detailing the emergence of a private 
enforcement model over a public one in American civil rights regulation). 
 
20
 See infra notes 142–143 and accompanying text (discussing equality directives in the 
United Kingdom). 
  
A. The Private Attorney General: The Standard Account 
Commentators that discuss civil rights statutes and their 
implementation typically focus on the private attorney general model.21 As 
I show in this section, the private attorney general model should continue to 
be recognized as a tool for promoting equity, given its capacity to address 
bias. However, recent Supreme Court cases have weakened the model. In 
addition, as I discuss below, the private attorney general model has other, 
more fundamental limitations as a mechanism for advancing equity and 
inclusion. 
1. Supplementing State Capacity 
Congress enacts civil rights statutes to promote antidiscrimination and 
equity goals, and to empower private individuals to enforce those goals 
through private litigation. The prime example is Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, the fair employment provision that often serves as a shorthand 
for civil rights.22 Title VII grants a private right of action to enforce its 
provisions forbidding employment discrimination, allowing individuals to 
litigate in court after exhausting administrative enforcement mechanisms.23 
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to increase the incentives 
for bringing private litigation, specifically by allowing individuals to seek 
both compensatory and punitive damages.24 Through litigation in individual 
and class actions, courts interpret the meaning of the substantive 
prohibitions of the statute. The idea is that once a sufficient number of 
cases are brought and high enough damages are awarded, employers—
whether faced with actual suits or to avoid the expense and adverse 
publicity of future litigation—will alter their practices to comply with 
court-endorsed interpretations of the statute.25 
This model is known as the “private” attorney general because it 
effectively delegates pursuit of the statute’s public goals to private parties. 
As Pamela Karlan states, the “idea behind the ‘private attorney general’” is 
 
 
21
 See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 
183, 186 (arguing that “[v]irtually all modern civil rights statutes rely heavily on private attorneys 
general”). 
 
22
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (2006). 
 
23
 See id. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2006) (granting individuals the right to bring suit after exhausting 
claims with the EEOC). 
 
24
 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, § 1977A, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006)). 
 
25
 See, e.g., Sean Farhang, Private Lawsuits, General Deterrence, and State Capacity: 
Evidence from Job Discrimination Litigation 4–7, 29 (Oct. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with the New York University Law Review) (summarizing commentary discussing the value 
of private litigation and its potential deterrent effects). 
  
simple: “Congress can vindicate important public policy goals by 
empowering private individuals to bring suit.”26 The case for the private 
attorney general, then, is that it supplements what even an ideally 
constituted, well-funded, and vigorous public enforcement agency could 
do. Private litigation engages the resources of a multitude of private actors 
in rooting out discrimination.27 Private litigators and their clients may bring 
greater passion, innovation, and effectiveness than public actors.28 
For this reason, courts have explicitly acknowledged the role private 
enforcement plays in supplementing inadequate public enforcement. In 
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,29 one of the first Supreme Court 
cases interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s provision prohibiting 
discrimination in public accommodations, the Court noted the limits of the 
public attorney general—the Department of Justice (DOJ) could bring only 
pattern-or-practice cases to enforce the statute—and endorsed strong 
private enforcement to further the statute’s broader public policy goals.30 
As the Court stated, a private civil rights plaintiff is no ordinary tort 
plaintiff: “If he obtains an injunction, he does so not for himself alone but 
also as a ‘private attorney general,’ vindicating a policy that Congress 
considered of the highest priority.”31 
The Court was similarly explicit in several interpretations of the Fair 
Housing Act (FHA) of 1968 in the initial decades after its enactment, 
before the 1988 amendments to the Act strengthened the FHA’s weak 
public and private enforcement provisions.32 With weak public enforcement 
 
 
26
 Karlan, supra note 21, at 186. 
 
27
 See Caroline R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights: 
The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1087, 
1094 (2007) (noting that private enforcement eliminates the need for a “large governmental 
enforcement apparatus”); Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 
788 (2011) (noting that private enforcement regimes can “supplement public efforts, picking up 
the slack where agency resources run out”). 
 
28
 See Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private 
Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1387 (2000) (arguing that 
a centralized regime of police misconduct prosecution lacks “the eyes, experiences, motivation, 
and resources of millions of Americans who bear witness to institutionalized wrongdoing and are 
willing to endure the expense of rooting it out”); Selmi, supra note 11, at 1404–05, 1444–47 
(discussing reasons why government lawyers may drift towards less controversial, easier to win 
cases). 
 
29
 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam). 
 
30
 Id. at 401 & n.2 (noting that when the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted, “it was 
evident that enforcement would prove difficult and that the Nation would have to rely in part 
upon private litigation as a means of securing broad compliance with the law”). 
 
31
 Id. at 402. 
 
32
 From its inception, the FHA included a private right of action, but the Act’s private 
enforcement provisions were weak, providing plaintiffs a short statute of limitations and courts a 
limited ability to award damages and attorneys’ fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(b) (1970) (subjecting 
  
capacity, the private enforcement that did occur was in large part enabled 
by Court-announced rules expanding standing and explicitly invoking the 
private attorney general function.33 
Private enforcement also reflects deliberate congressional choices to 
enforce public norms through litigation and (though less explicitly) to cope 
with state incapacity. Encouraging private enforcement occurs through 
explicit grants of private rights to sue,34 but it is also manifest in 
congressional provisions granting attorneys’ fees to prevailing civil rights 
plaintiffs,35 waiving sovereign immunity for damages actions,36 and 
expanding damages for civil rights violations.37 In the 1988 amendments to 
the FHA, key proponents recognized a need to strengthen the previously 
weak private enforcement provisions.38 In the end, the amendments 
 
FHA claims to a 180-day statute of limitations); 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1) (1970) (capping punitive 
damages at $1000). HUD, though charged with enforcing the statute, had no power to bring 
enforcement actions, or even to hold hearings; rather, it had the power only to conciliate claims it 
found meritorious, or seek civil penalties, which were set at low rates. Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. 
No. 90-284, § 810(a), 82 Stat. 73, 85 (1968) (setting out the 1968 FHA’s administrative 
enforcement regime). The weak enforcement provisions would hamper the Act’s effectiveness at 
least until the 1988 Amendments. See GEORGE R. METCALF, FAIR HOUSING COMES OF AGE 4–5 
(1988) (explaining that limitations on attorneys’ fees in the original FHA reduced the number of 
attorneys willing to take cases). In addition, the original FHA allowed HUD to refer only a 
limited set of cases to the DOJ for litigation—pattern-or-practice cases, or cases that raised an 
issue of “general public importance.” 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a) (1970). 
 
33
 See Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208, 211 (1972) (noting that weak 
public enforcement capacity rendered private suits the “main generating force” in the FHA); see 
also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373–74 (1982) (finding standing under the 
FHA for fair housing testers—minorities and Whites who “pose as renters or purchasers for the 
purpose of” determining whether housing providers and realtors are violating fair housing laws). 
Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109–15 (1979) (holding that a municipality 
and four of its residents had standing to bring a claim against realtors illegally steering Blacks and 
Whites seeking homes to different neighborhoods). 
 
34
 See, e.g., Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(i) (2006) (authorizing 
private lawsuits after exhaustion of claims with the EEOC); Title VIII, Fair Housing Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 3613 (2006) (authorizing persons to bring suit in federal or state court without filing an 
administrative complaint); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12117(a), 
12188(a)(1) (2006) (detailing procedures for private enforcement in court). 
 
35
 See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)–(c) 
(2006) (allowing prevailing plaintiffs in certain civil rights actions to recover attorneys’ fees); see 
also Lemos, supra note 27, at 790–91 (describing congressional statutes that incentivize private 
litigation through fee recovery). 
 
36
 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a) (2006) (abrogating a state’s sovereign immunity in 
damages actions to enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to d-7, 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88, and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 6101–07). 
 
37
 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006) (allowing prevailing plaintiffs the right to recover 
compensatory and punitive damages not to exceed from $50,000 to $300,000, depending on 
employer size). 
 
38
 See, e.g., Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1987: Hearing on S. 558 Before the Subcomm. 
  
lengthened the statute of limitations and expanded plaintiffs’ ability to 
recover attorneys’ fees and punitive damages.39 Similarly, the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 authorized compensatory and punitive damages to enforce 
certain provisions of Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA).40 Key drafters in committee reports recognized the damages 
provisions as necessary to encourage victims to seek redress for 
discrimination and to deter future acts of discrimination.41 These new 
incentives likely explain the profound increase in the amount of private 
litigation brought to enforce Title VII.42 
More recently, members of Congress have invoked the private 
attorney general as they craft responses to the Supreme Court’s recent 
decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly43 and in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.44 
These decisions moved away from the liberal pleading regime of Conley v. 
Gibson45 by requiring that plaintiffs in federal courts plead their claims 
with “plausibility.”46 This standard may have increased the pleading burden 
on plaintiffs and made it more difficult to survive a motion to dismiss and 
proceed to discovery, with potentially grave effects for the survival of 
many civil rights claims.47 Some commentators argue that the cases’ impact 
 
on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 64, 66 (1987) (statement of 
Benjamin L. Hooks, Chief Executive Officer/Executive Director, NAACP) (“The chief defect in 
the existing fair housing law is its lack of an adequate enforcement mechanism.”); METCALF, 
supra note 32, at 21–23 (detailing advocacy and legislative efforts beginning in the mid-1970s to 
strengthen the FHA). 
 
39
 See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA), Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 813(a), (c), 
102 Stat. 1619, 1633 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (2006)). 
 
40
 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 102, 1977A, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a). 
 
41
 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-644, pt. 1, at 39–42, 44–45 (1990) (explaining the committee’s 
view on the importance of ensuring that plaintiffs could recover damages, attorneys’ fees, and 
expert fees); S. REP. NO. 101-315, at 32 (1990) (“The failure to provide compensatory and 
punitive damages in Title VII leaves the statute without a meaningful deterrent for intentional 
discrimination on the job.”). 
 
42
 In the six years following the passage of the 1991 Act, job discrimination lawsuits in 
federal court increased by 211%. FARHANG, supra note 6, at 200. The newly enacted Title I of 
the ADA partially accounts for this growth via increases in disability claims. But analyses of 
EEOC filings suggest that increases in Title VII claims after the passage of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991 were also responsible for much of this growth. Id. at 200–01. 
 
43
 550 U.S. 554 (2007). 
 
44
 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 
45
 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 
46
 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–80 (applying Twombly’s 
plausibility standard to a civil rights claim). 
 
47
 See, e.g., Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter 
Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 624 (2010) (finding a significantly higher rate of complaint 
dismissals after Iqbal and Twombly than under the previous pleading regime and concluding that 
“Twombly and Iqbal are poised to have their greatest impact on civil rights cases, simply because 
those cases are by far the most likely type of case to be attacked by a 12(b)(6) motion”); Joseph 
  
is vastly overstated.48 But at the very least the decisions increase the 
discretion judges have to dismiss civil rights claims, potentially operating 
as a kind of heightened pleading standard.49 
The rules governing pleading, discovery, and access to courts—rules 
created by Congress, administrative actors, and the judiciary—are 
important planks in the foundation that enables the private attorney general. 
In considering legislation to overturn Twombly and Iqbal, many members 
of Congress explicitly invoked private enforcement as a key to vindicating 
statutory and constitutional goals of equality.50 The implicit assumption is 
that public enforcement is inadequate. Indeed, congressional responses 
feature neither expansions of administrative capacity nor mechanisms to 
prosecute civil rights claims. 
2. The Favored Model 
The primacy of the private attorney general model was not inevitable, 
but it has become the central conception of civil rights enforcement for 
good reason: In the end, it was the best deal that civil rights advocates 
could get from Congress. When Congress debated the fair employment 
provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, civil rights supporters initially 
 
A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment 
Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1029–31 (finding a higher rate of dismissal in 
Title VII opinions issued after Twombly). 
 
48
 See Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1298–99 (2010) 
(arguing that Twombly and Iqbal can be read consistently with the case law on pleading that 
preceded them); see also JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR 
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 28 (2011), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf (reporting to the 
Federal Judicial Center a finding of no statistically significant increase in the number of motions 
to dismiss granted in most types of civil cases after Iqbal and Twombly). 
 
49
 See Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-dismissal Discovery 
Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
65, 65 (2010) (arguing that Twombly and Iqbal have a distinct “detrimental effect” on “potentially 
meritorious civil rights cases alleging intentional discrimination”); Suja A. Thomas, Oddball 
Iqbal and Twombly and Employment Discrimination, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 225–26 (arguing 
that Twombly and Iqbal are likely to result in increased dismissal of employment discrimination 
cases by importing a summary judgment standard of plausibility into the motion to dismiss, and 
citing provisional data consistent with that conclusion); see also Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and 
Iqbal’s Measure: An Assessment of the Federal Judicial Center's Study of Motions to Dismiss, 6 
FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 7–8, 21–22, 28–31 (2012) (arguing that the FJC study’s data was incomplete 
in significant respects, that the study set too high a threshold for statistical significance, and that 
the study likely underestimates the cases’ effects on complaint filing and dismissals). 
 
50
 See, e.g., Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1–3 (2009) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (discussing the importance of pleading standards in 
allowing victims to enforce laws prohibiting discrimination). 
  
pursued a bureaucratic enforcement regime of resolving complaints, 
modeled on the National Labor Relations Act and state fair employment 
practices commissions.51 The administrative agency would investigate 
charges, determine if probable cause existed, conciliate claims, and if 
conciliation failed, prosecute claims before the agency’s quasi-judicial 
board.52 This initial model made administrative enforcement exclusive, 
with no private right to sue in court.53 For civil rights proponents, the 
administrative process was superior to the judicial process: cheaper, 
quicker, less complex, more flexible, and more predictable and coherent 
than private litigation.54 After opponents resisted the creation of powerful 
federal administrative agencies with the authority to resolve civil rights 
claims,55 private enforcement emerged as the compromise.56 
So, while civil rights proponents might not have initially supported the 
private attorney general model, by the time of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
private enforcement had emerged as the favored model. The Act provided 
new compensatory and punitive damages for Title VII claims to enhance 
 
 
51
 See FARHANG, supra note 6, at 98–99 (describing early visions of the EEOC). 
 
52
 Under initial proposals, the EEOC would have consisted of an Office of the Administrator 
and a five-member board. Proponents envisioned the board as a quasi-judicial body appointed by 
the President, confirmed by the Senate, and serving staggered seven-year terms. Id. 
 
53
 See id. at 99 (detailing the advantages civil rights advocates perceived in administrative 
enforcement). 
 
54
 Id. at 99. Political scientist Sean Farhang documents the faith advocates placed in 
administrative enforcement of individual claims and recounts their belief that administrative 
agencies would be more expert, consistent, and “proactive[]” than courts. Id. at 100. 
 
55
 Opponents (and some supporters) of civil rights resisted these proposals for a range of 
reasons, but most prominently because it would vest too much power in the federal government—
particularly in a single-mission federal agency like the EEOC. See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 146 (1990) (describing the original vision of the EEOC). Four years later, 
opponents similarly resisted fair housing legislation that empowered HUD to investigate 
complaints, hold evidentiary hearings, and issue enforcement orders. See METCALF, supra note 
32, at 18 (recounting legislative moves stripping HUD of its authority to enforce housing claims). 
 
56
 See FARHANG, supra note 6, at 98–109 (detailing Title VII’s legislative history). Private 
enforcement proposals emerged first, in a limited way, in House Republican amendments to Title 
VII. See id. at 105 (documenting an initial amendment that would have granted a private cause of 
action with Commission authorization and without attorneys’ fees). Civil rights proponents 
successfully pushed Congress to enact a fee-shifting provision in Title VII. See ALFRED W. 
BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW: THE LAW TRANSMISSION SYSTEM AND EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY 48 (1993) (arguing that advocates saw fees as necessary to ensure that claimants 
could obtain counsel); FARHANG, supra note 6, at 111 (relaying the recollection of Jack 
Greenberg, the former head of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF), that civil rights advocates 
“supported counsel fees for prevailing plaintiffs as the only way to make private enforcement 
feasible”). Similarly, private enforcement emerged as a compromise in housing discrimination, 
though the FHA’s private enforcement mechanism was weaker than those in employment 
discrimination. See Olatunde Johnson, The Last Plank: Rethinking Public and Private Power to 
Advance Fair Housing, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1191, 1205–07 (2011) (describing the FHA’s 
initially weak private enforcement regime). 
  
private enforcement.57 A recent study by political scientist Sean Farhang 
rethinks congressional moves to enhance private enforcement not simply as 
the abdication of strong state enforcement of civil rights but as harnessing 
private litigation to enhance state capacity.58 The damages provision of the 
1991 Act, attorneys’ fees provisions, and Congress’s initial enactments of 
private enforcement regimes thus can all be viewed as congressional moves 
to harness courts to supplement government regulation.59 According to this 
interpretation of civil rights enforcement, Congressional hearings and 
proposed legislation in response to Iqbal and Twombly become part of the 
same phenomenon—seeking to remove constraints on private court 
enforcement rather than enhancing additional administrative enforcement 
of Title VII or other civil rights statutes. 
The private attorney general model also pervades scholarly reactions 
to other civil rights statutes. For example, the Supreme Court has limited 
the enforcement of another key provision of the 1964 Civil Rights Act: 
Title VI, which prohibits discrimination by entities that receive federal 
funding.60 In Alexander v. Sandoval,61 the Court declined to imply a private 
right of action to enforce the disparate impact regulations of Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. From the perspective of civil rights advocates, 
the decision was nothing less than a tragedy. Sandoval ended a nascent 
litigation strategy that invoked Title VI’s disparate impact regulations to 
address contemporary racial disparities in the use of federal and state 
transportation resources, health care access, and environmental quality.62 
Professor Pamela Karlan grouped Sandoval with a series of cases that made 
it difficult or impossible to bring private enforcement actions. She argued 
that the case was part of a trend of Supreme Court jurisprudence 
“disarming the private attorney general.”63 
Yet describing Title VI as a “private attorney general statute” is 
awkward—not because Sandoval was correct in holding that no private 
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 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, §§ 102, 1977A(a)–(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1072–73 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006)). 
 
58
 See FARHANG, supra note 6, at 3–4 (arguing that Congress makes a “legislative choice” in 
relying on private litigation in statutory implementation). 
 
59
 See id. at 190–92 (providing an account of congressional intent to shore up private 
enforcement of Title VII through creation of a damages remedy). 
 
60
 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) (forbidding programs and activities receiving federal funds 
from discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national origin). 
 
61
 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
 
62
 See Philip Tegeler, Title VI Enforcement in the Post-Sandoval Era, POVERTY & RACE 
(Poverty & Race Research Action Council, D.C.), Sept./Oct. 2010, at 5 (“The scope of what civil 
rights advocates and their clients lost in Sandoval is staggering . . . .”). 
 
63
 Karlan, supra note 21, at 183, 187. 
  
remedy existed to enforce Title VI’s disparate impact regulations,64 but 
because Title VI is not written as a classic private attorney general statute. 
Rather, Title VI primarily uses bureaucratic power to promote racial equity 
goals and to cleanse federal funds of discrimination.65 For that reason, Title 
VI is more accurately seen not just as a source of individual rights in 
federally funded programs,66 but also as imposing a set of duties on 
federally funded recipients: duties to not discriminate and broader duties to 
promote equity.67 Despite this structure, Title VI has come to be seen 
primarily as just another statute in the private attorney general arsenal. This 
suggests the dominance of the private attorney general model in our 
conception of civil rights law and the perceived lack of value associated 
with public enforcement. Even more, it reveals implicit skepticism about an 
alternative that Title VI would seem to allow: relying on the state to 
promote equity norms through regulatory and programmatic means. 
3. Limitations 
Given the potential power of private litigation and the longstanding 
 
 
64
 Section 601 of Title VI provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground 
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or 
be subject to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 
42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Despite the lack of an explicit private right of action in the statute, Court 
decisions prior to Sandoval had endorsed the view that the statute created a private remedy for 
violations of section 601. See Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 593–95 
(1983) (White, J.) (holding that legislative history and the Court’s prior decisions supported such 
a holding). Sandoval is consistent with the Supreme Court’s recent aversion to implied private 
rights of action. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 276 (2002) (finding that the 
Federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act could not be privately enforced using 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (1984 & Supp. V 2000)). 
 
65
 See infra notes 131–136 and accompanying text (recounting the emergence of Title VI). 
 
66
 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (“No person . . . shall . . . be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”). 
 
67
 See infra text accompanying notes 137–141 (describing the agency equality directives 
promulgated to enforce Title VI and Title VIII). Karlan recognizes this when she notes that the 
Sandoval Court should have asked whether section 602 of the statute, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
2000d-1, “contemplates allowing private parties to enforce the obligations that regulations impose 
on the recipients of federal funds,” and not simply whether it was a source of individual rights. 
Karlan, supra note 21, at 198. Under this conception, private attorneys general are not simply 
delegated to vindicate congressional policy. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 
401–02 (1968) (describing the private attorney general’s function). They are akin to qui tam 
litigants—private persons who use statutory and common law mechanisms to sue on behalf of the 
government for legal violations and earn a portion of the recovery—enforcing a duty that is owed 
to the government but improperly enforced by the government. See Karlan, supra note 21, at 
198–99 (comparing the private attorney general and qui tam models). This latter analogy is 
particularly apt in describing the relationship between private parties and public authorities in 
Title VI and Title VIII. See infra Part IV.C.1.a (describing the role of litigation in helping to 
enforce and strengthen fair housing equality directives). 
  
and deep American attachment to courts as a forum for vindicating rights,68 
the dominant view risks obscuring the downsides of the private attorney 
general model. For example, the success of private enforcement depends 
heavily on the judicial embrace of rules governing pleading, summary 
judgment, standing, and fee recovery that make private enforcement 
possible.69 As noted above, some of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions 
have interpreted procedural and litigation-enabling rules in ways that 
hinder private enforcement.70 Similarly, the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes—involving claims of systemic 
gender discrimination in pay and promotion practices—tightened the 
requirements for class actions in cases seeking monetary damages71 for 
discriminatory employment practices.72 Wal-Mart powerfully illustrates the 
tensions involved in the private attorney general model. Class actions 
provide a potential way to surmount some of the problems of pursuing 
discrimination claims through individualized action. For instance, they 
allow for the aggregation of smaller claims and provide an avenue for 
structural and injunctive relief that is often elusive or unsought in 
individual claims. The Supreme Court in the past has recognized 
employment discrimination cases as paradigmatic class actions, noting that 
“suits alleging racial or ethnic discrimination are often by their very nature 
class suits, involving class-wide wrongs.”73 But, while the damages 
provisions of the 1991 Civil Rights Act incentivize attorneys to bring 
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 See KAGAN, supra note 9, at 14–16 (describing America’s historic reliance on private 
litigation as an alternative to bureaucratic regulation and government authority). 
 
69
 See Lemos, supra note 27, at 823–30 (detailing how judges respond to perceptions of 
excessive litigation by narrowing their interpretations of fee-shifting, standing, pleading, and 
other statutes that create litigation incentives). 
 
70
 See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text (describing the impact of the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal). 
 
71
 See 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557–61 (2011). In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled 
that the plaintiffs’ backpay claims could not be certified as a class action under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), because their monetary relief claims required individualized calculation 
of damages and thus were not incidental to the injunctive or declaratory relief sought. Id. at 2557. 
 
72
 The Court held 5-4 that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy Rule 23(a)’s commonality 
requirement because they lacked “significant proof” that Wal-Mart “operat[ed] under a general 
policy of discrimination.” Id. at 2554 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 
n.15 (1982)). In so holding, the majority discounted the plaintiffs’ expert, as well as statistical and 
anecdotal evidence that Wal-Mart’s corporate culture and systems for determining pay and 
advancement pervasively discriminated against women throughout the company’s stores. Wal-
Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553–56; see also id. at 2563–64 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (summarizing 
plaintiffs’ evidence of systemic and nationwide discrimination). 
 
73
 E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977). For a discussion 
of the pre-Wal-Mart approach to class actions, see Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination 
Class Actions Survive, 37 AKRON L. REV. 813 (2004). Hart notes that “employment 
discrimination cases have typified the sort of civil rights action that courts and commentators 
describe as uniquely suited to resolution by class action litigation.” Id. at 813. 
  
employment discrimination cases, including class actions, the recent Wal-
Mart decision creates significant barriers to pursuing monetary damages 
cases as nationwide class actions.74 
In addition to recently created judicial barriers to private enforcement, 
reliance on litigation has longstanding and well-documented costs and 
challenges. Litigation can be time-consuming, protracted, and inefficient, 
exacting great financial and emotional costs on litigants.75 When Congress 
incentivizes litigation, it increases the workload for federal (and often state) 
courts.76 The volume of fair employment litigation is a particular focal 
point for debates about the costs and value of litigation; courts and 
commentators often frame judicial rules tightening pleading and summary 
judgment as a response to such cases.77 Normative views aside, 
employment cases are often perceived as flooding courts and thus 
dismissed as frivolous.78 As a result, as Professor Margaret Lemos argues, 
efforts to enhance litigation through fee-shifting and damages 
enhancements may have the perverse effect of leading to increased hostility 
to plaintiffs’ claims, whether they actually increase litigation or not.79 
Moreover, even if one rejects the claim that there is too much 
litigation compared to the number of actual civil rights injuries, 
overreliance on private litigation may skew the nature of civil rights 
enforcement. Attorneys have an incentive to pursue primarily cases with 
high damages or easily identifiable injuries. For instance, researchers have 
documented a shift in Title VII employment cases away from cases focused 
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 However, the Court left open the possibility that some claims for monetary relief might still 
be certified under Rule 23(b)(2). See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557 (declining to reach the 
“broader” question of whether Rule 23(b)(2) “applies only to requests for such injunctive or 
declaratory relief and does not authorize the class certification of monetary claims at all”). 
 
75
 See Lemos, supra note 27, at 789–90 (noting that the expense of litigation is often not 
worth the cost); see also KAGAN, supra note 9, at 104–25 (detailing some of the pitfalls of 
America’s civil justice system, including the high costs, inefficiencies, and injustice generated by 
redundancy, complexity, and adversarialism). 
 
76
 For instance, Professor Farhang has found a rise in federal court litigation immediately 
following the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which enhanced private enforcement capacity. See 
FARHANG, supra note 6, at 200–01 (documenting the “abrupt and steep increase in job 
discrimination lawsuits” in federal courts following enactment of the 1991 Act and contending 
that much of this increase is attributable to the Act’s changes to Title VII). 
 
77
 See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: 
The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
517, 564–66 (2010) (describing the possible connection between judicial skepticism about the 
merit of employment discrimination cases and the rise in summary judgments and Federal Rule 
12(b)(6) dismissals). 
 
78
 See Lemos, supra note 27, at 826–27 (documenting judicial and scholarly concern about 
“frivolous” litigation). 
 
79
 See id. at 784–85 (arguing that litigation incentives may trigger judicial backlash). 
  
on hiring and toward those focused on firing and promotion.80 This may, of 
course, reflect a decrease in actual incidents of hiring discrimination—but 
more likely it suggests that hiring discrimination is harder to identify and, 
when litigated, generates fewer damages.81 This shift away from hiring 
discrimination and toward high-damage cases likely makes Title VII 
litigation less effective for addressing the problems of low-income 
individuals and those seeking to enter the job market. 
Additionally, by placing the burden on the individual to complain, 
entire areas of civil rights may go underenforced. For instance, despite the 
pervasiveness of housing discrimination and the incentives created by the 
FHA, relatively few housing discrimination cases are brought, particularly 
when compared to documented incidents of discrimination.82 The 1988 
amendments to the FHA made private enforcement easier, but led to only a 
modest upswing in litigation.83 In part, this may be because—like 
discrimination in hiring—many aspects of housing discrimination are hard 
to identify. In failure-to-rent and in steering cases (directing housing 
seekers to particular neighborhoods and away from others on the basis of 
race or ethnicity), victims are often unaware and fail to come forward.84 
I do not mean to downplay the importance of the private attorney 
general. As noted above, its centrality to conceptions of civil rights 
enforcement is well earned. Such litigation can prompt real change.85 But it 
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 See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment 
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015–17 (1991) (explaining an empirical 
analysis showing that, while hiring cases dominated EEOC and court dockets in 1966, by 1985 
wrongful termination charges significantly outnumbered hiring cases). 
 
81
 See id. at 1017 & n.107 (arguing that it is unlikely that hiring discrimination has decreased 
given the persistence of discrimination in termination and noting that hiring cases are likely to 
generate fewer monetary damages than termination cases). 
 
82
 See MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., URBAN INST., DISCRIMINATION IN 
METROPOLITAN HOUSING MARKETS: NATIONAL RESULTS FROM PHASE I HDS 2000, at iii-v 
(2002), available at http://www.huduser.org/portal/Publications/pdf/Phase1_Report.pdf (showing 
the prevalence of contemporary discrimination in metropolitan housing); Johnson, supra note 56, 
at 1201–04 (detailing the challenges of individual enforcement in housing). 
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 See Robert G. Schwemm, Why Do Landlords Still Discriminate (and What Can Be Done 
About It)?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 455, 465–67 (2007) (providing evidence that the 1988 
amendments have done little to spur litigation or to significantly diminish housing 
discrimination). 
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 See John Goering, An Overview of Key Issues in the Field of Fair Housing Research, in 
FRAGILE RIGHTS WITHIN CITIES: GOVERNMENT, HOUSING, AND FAIRNESS 19, 28 (John Goering 
ed., 2007) (explaining that only a fraction of actual victims of housing discrimination make use of 
the enforcement system). 
 
85
 See, e.g., Farhang, supra note 25, at 29–31 (concluding from empirical evidence that the 
threat of private enforcement litigation led employers to adopt equal opportunity practices that 
improved employment outcomes for women and minorities, but noting that the data failed to 
establish that private enforcement regimes were more effective than administrative enforcement 
regimes). 
  
is crucial to understand the limitations as well as the value of the regime in 
addressing civil rights problems today. 
B. The Usual Meaning of Public Enforcement 
Critics typically measure the limitations of the private enforcement 
model against public enforcement, which has become the less desirable 
alternative. In the civil rights context, public enforcement generally means 
one of two things. The first is public enforcement of claims through 
litigation in court, such as claims of discrimination brought by the DOJ or 
by other federal agencies with standing, including the EEOC. The second is 
the administrative adjudication of federal civil rights claims.86 As I discuss 
next, these forms of public enforcement can serve as an important 
complement to private enforcement by bringing public attention and 
resources to civil rights cases, particularly those cases unlikely to receive 
adequate attention from the private bar. But the structural and practical 
weaknesses of agencies tasked with enforcing civil rights has limited their 
public enforcement capacity. 
1. The Potential of Public Enforcement 
Federal agencies have public enforcement capacities that complement 
the private attorney general models prevalent in housing and employment. 
In the context of employment, the EEOC has investigative and 
prosecutorial authority to enforce a range of federal employment laws, 
including Title VII, the ADA, and the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (ADEA).87 Under Title VII, for instance, individuals must first file a 
charge of discrimination with the EEOC, and the EEOC then has 180 days 
after filing to investigate the claim.88 After 180 days an individual may 
request that the EEOC issue a “Notice of Right to Sue,” which allows the 
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 These two functions can also operate as a hybrid, as in the case of HUD. See infra notes 
92–95 and accompanying text (describing HUD’s powers under the Fair Housing Act). 
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 Congress amended Title VII in 1972, vesting the EEOC with authority to bring suits in 
court. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act (EEOA), Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 103, 
104 (1972) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2) (2006)) (“[T]he Commission, or 
the Attorney General in a case involving a government, governmental agency, or political 
subdivision, may bring an action for appropriate temporary or preliminary relief pending final 
disposition of such charge.”). 
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 See Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (e), (f) (2006) (detailing the procedures for filing a 
Title VII charge with the EEOC and for bringing claims in court); see also Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 626 (2006) (providing that plaintiffs may pursue a civil 
action sixty days after filing a charge with the EEOC); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 
42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2006) (adopting the filing and exhaustion requirements of Title VII). 
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claimant to proceed with a complaint in federal or state court.89 If the 
EEOC finds merit in a charge of discrimination, the agency lacks power to 
adjudicate the claim, but the parties may enter into conciliation procedures 
with the EEOC to resolve the claim. If the conciliation is unsuccessful, the 
EEOC may file suit on behalf of the claimant or itself in court.90 The 
Attorney General can also bring “pattern or practice” cases.91 
In the context of housing, the FHA grants HUD authority to 
investigate claims of discrimination while simultaneously seeking to 
conciliate the claim.92 Additionally, the 1988 Amendments to the FHA 
created a new administrative enforcement scheme that allows victims to 
pursue claims before administrative law judges (ALJs).93 If HUD 
determines that reasonable cause exists for the discrimination claim, it files 
a charge with the ALJ. At that point either party may elect to proceed in 
federal district court. If neither party does so, the case is heard by an ALJ, 
who has the power to issue a ruling and grant compensatory damages, 
injunctive relief, and civil penalties up to $50,000.94 All parties may be 
represented by counsel in proceedings before HUD ALJs.95 
The benefits of public enforcement by the Attorney General can be 
significant. Public agencies bring substantial litigation and investigative 
resources to tackle civil rights problems. The DOJ in particular may have a 
greater capacity to bring systemic claims than individuals. Moreover, fear 
of unleashing the state’s investigative and enforcement apparatus may 
prompt defendants to settle their claims and may curb discriminatory 
behavior by others. Cases brought by federal agencies may garner greater 
press and public attention and thus serve as a powerful mechanism for 
remedying discrimination. Furthermore, in some areas, the federal 
government has practical tools for enforcement unavailable to private 
litigants. For instance, HUD has the power to conduct housing tests96 and 
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can bring claims based on the results of tests and other investigations, even 
without the presence of an actual victim.97 
In the second conception of public enforcement, agencies provide 
catalyzation for the resolution of antidiscrimination claims. The EEOC 
lacks adjudicative capacity, but does have the ability to investigate claims 
and seek conciliation agreements between parties. The strongest civil rights 
administrative enforcement scheme, at least on paper, now belongs to 
HUD.98 The potential advantages of the HUD system are numerous. Given 
the expense and time of litigation, proponents of the 1988 amendments 
bolstered administrative enforcement to serve as a cheaper, less 
burdensome way of securing compliance with the FHA.99 
2. The Less Favored Alternative 
As noted above, proponents initially desired strong administrative 
enforcement of the federal civil rights laws. The reality of enforcement has 
often proved less palatable. In terms of prosecutorial and adjudicative 
effectiveness, the empirical analyses of agency enforcement are sobering. 
The EEOC is consistently plagued with backlogs and long delays in 
investigating and processing claims.100 Meanwhile, staffing and other 
administrative problems have historically hampered HUD’s ability to 
investigate discrimination claims.101 Empirical studies also show low rates 
of usage of the ALJ process by HUD claimants as compared with federal 
courts.102 When ALJs adjudicate cases, they tend to award much lower 
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penalties than those gained for similar cases in court proceedings.103 
Administrative enforcement is also inconsistent for structural and 
political reasons. Some presidential administrations may fail to vigorously 
enforce civil rights laws or may change or alter priorities in particular 
areas.104 Similarly, congressional oversight of agency action might be weak 
or nonexistent, depending on members’ interests, politics, and competing 
priorities. In addition, the government’s dual role as enforcer of civil rights 
and defendant in civil rights cases may lead it to adopt positions less 
favorable to civil rights claimants.105 
Civil rights scholars are generally skeptical about the potential for 
enforcement through administrative adjudication or public attorneys 
general. Comparing the EEOC and HUD’s enforcement record with those 
of private litigants, Professor Michael Selmi argues that a fundamental 
problem in government lawyering is that government lawyers are generally 
less vigorous, innovative, and passionate than private attorneys.106 The 
statutory requirements for civil rights agencies are another obstacle. For 
example, Title VII requires individuals first to exhaust their claims with the 
EEOC. But the agency is crippled under the weight of processing 
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individual claims, has the capacity to investigate only a few, and in the end 
determines that the vast majority of claims have no merit.107 The agency 
appears to some commentators primarily as a hindrance to quick judicial 
resolution of plaintiffs’ claims, superintending an administrative process 
that in the end is “strange and vacuous.”108 The shift to emphasizing private 
enforcement of Title VII and other federal employment discrimination 
claims in the 1991 Civil Rights Act represents the gradual culmination of a 
loss of faith in the use of executive power to implement Title VII.109 
Similarly, HUD by some accounts is a “weak institutional home” for civil 
rights enforcement—big and lumbering, serving multiple roles, and 
controlled by interests actively hostile to civil rights.110 As a result, civil 
rights advocates have called for federal actors to move civil rights 
enforcement authority outside of HUD to a separate dedicated enforcement 
agency akin to the EEOC, or to an agency combined with the EEOC.111 
In the end, researchers and civil rights commentators find little 
favorable to say about the enforcement efficacy of administrative agencies 
or, in the case of the EEOC, its formal statutory role.112 To be sure, civil 
rights advocates continue to appeal for strengthened federal agency 
capacity, recognizing its potential value.113 Academic commentators seem 
less hopeful: Attention in legal commentary to public enforcement often 
ends with a call for strengthening mechanisms for private enforcement.114 
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C. A Third Model: American Equality Directives 
Standard academic conceptions of civil rights implementation center 
on judicial and quasi-judicial models for resolving claims. The current 
account of institutional choice for civil rights enforcement involves debates 
over the best place for adjudication (court or agency) and who should 
prosecute (public or private actors).115 Omitted from this account is the fact 
that the Civil Rights Act of 1964—which by these accounts ushered in an 
emphasis on private enforcement—also contained Title VI. Title VI targets 
bureaucratic enforcement. Standard conceptions of civil rights enforcement 
also fail to properly account for Title VIII of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 
which requires federal agencies to “affirmatively” “further fair housing.”116 
In effect, these narratives overlook another strand in the civil rights 
regulatory regime: statutes and implementing regulations that operate as 
directives to the administrative state. 
I demonstrate below that statutes like Title VI and Title VIII are 
structured to engage federal administrative power not only by promoting 
compliance by public and private discriminators, but also by targeting the 
administrative state—the set of federal, state, and local programs enabled 
by federal funding—as the very object of the enforcement or rule-setting 
activity. Under these statutes, a set of regulatory requirements has emerged 
that places proactive and affirmative duties on federally funded actors. My 
aim is not to present these equality directives as a solution to all the 
limitations of traditional or public and private enforcement, or to argue that 
they should supplant those important models. Rather, it is to show that the 
exclusive focus on public and private enforcement ignores a form of 
regulatory intervention that can powerfully augment traditional forms of 
civil rights implementation. Equality directives harness agencies’ 
regulatory capacity, not just their enforcement or claim-resolution capacity. 
And, because of a set of specific features that I describe below, these 
directives have the power to do more than combat discrimination or bias. 
Rather, equality directives aim at redesigning government programs and 
policies—in housing, transportation, agriculture, and other areas—to 
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address the way inequality and exclusion operate in contemporary 
American society. 
In the next section, I provide an overview of the statutes and 
regulations that create “equality directives.” I discuss the key features of 
these statutes and regulations that both distinguish them from traditional 
civil rights enforcement regimes and give them a power that is particularly 
salient today. In Part III, I will build on this introduction to provide a more 
detailed elaboration of how this regulatory regime operates in the two key 
areas of transportation and housing. 
1. Overview of Equality Directive Statutes and Regulations 
As my primary examples of equality directives, I use the regulatory 
regimes implementing Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Title VIII 
of the Fair Housing Act.117 Title VI prohibits racial and ethnic 
discrimination in federal spending, which covers federal programs and 
activities as well as state and local entities receiving federal funds.118 A key 
provision in Title VIII requires that federal agencies and grant recipients 
affirmatively pursue fair housing.119 By placing positive duties on state 
actors, these regimes build on the antidiscrimination base provided by these 
statutes. 
These core civil rights statutes are long-standing, but the strengthening 
and specifying of affirmative duties under these statutes are relatively 
recent. For instance, a recent Department of Transportation (DOT) 
guidance implementing Title VI requires state and local actors receiving 
urban transit funds to assess whether their programs and activities have a 
deleterious impact on racial and ethnic groups, to include racial and ethnic 
minorities in their planning, and to consider less discriminatory 
alternatives.120 Similarly, a 2003 guidance from the Department of 
Agriculture implementing Title VI requires federal agencies and their 
grantees to conduct a “civil rights impact analysis” that analyzes the 
 
 
117
 Another example outside Title VI and Title VIII is the recently enacted statutory 
requirement that federal grantees address racial disparities in the juvenile justice system. See 42 
U.S.C. § 5633(15) (2006). For a discussion, see Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 374 (2007). The juvenile justice directives stem from a statute enacted in 1992, 
while here I focus on directives emerging from longstanding civil rights statutes. 
 
118
 Section 601 of Title VI provides that “no person . . . shall, on the ground of race, color, or 
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 
2000d (2006). 
 
119
 See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (2006) (requiring the Secretary of HUD to 
administer their programs and activities to “affirmatively further the policies” of the Fair Housing 
Act); see id. § 5304(b)(2) (requiring the same of federal community development grantees). 
 
120
 FTA C 4702.1A, supra note 1, at IV-4, V-6 to -7. 
  
proposed effect of their policies and actions on racial and ethnic minorities 
and persons with disabilities.121 Regulations implementing Title VI also 
require the DOT to assess whether any negative environmental and health 
impacts fall disproportionately on particular racial and ethnic groups and 
on low-income populations, and to take steps to mitigate these concerns.122 
Title VIII is explicitly affirmative in its statutory mandate, requiring 
that agencies and grantees take proactive steps to promote fair housing 
goals.123 A range of regulations, executive orders, and agency guidance 
documents make this statutory mandate more specific. These rules require 
agencies and grantees to promote racial and economic integration in 
selecting sites for subsidized and public housing; to assess and remove 
barriers to integration and inclusion at the state and local levels; to collect 
data on the effects of federally funded housing programs on segregation 
and integration; and to structure housing vouchers and homeless assistance 
programs to allow recipients to live in low-poverty neighborhoods.124 As is 
evident from the above account, these requirements range in kind. Some 
statutes and regulations place broad normative goals on state actors to 
promote equity, such as requiring federal agencies and grantees to take 
steps to “further fair housing” or to avoid “discrimination.”125 Others 
require states and localities to self-assess as to whether their actions are 
causing harm to particular groups and to take steps to remove that harm.126 
Some statutes require the inclusion of affected communities (including 
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underrepresented communities) in their planning.127 Yet all require front-
end planning with the goal of equity and inclusion. As a result, this 
regulatory framework has provided the impetus for changes in policies and 
programs that alter the very landscape that allows inequality. For instance, 
this framework has led decisionmakers to change who benefits from public 
transit and housing programs, to determine where public transit and 
subsidized housing are located, and to lift zoning and other barriers to 
housing integration.128 This regulatory approach does more than require 
that governments address bias against minority or other groups.129 It 
requires entities to rethink and redesign government-supported structures to 
proactively promote the inclusion of groups that, whether through 
discrimination, historic exclusion, or structural difference, are 
disadvantaged socially and economically. 
2. Essential Features  
These directives take a different approach to achieving racial and 
other forms of inclusion than do the standard public and private 
enforcement models. Their essential attributes are that (1) they are 
regulatory in their approach; (2) they are affirmative and not just 
prohibitory; and (3) they impose a set of pervasive duties for federal-state 
programs. 
a. Regulatory Directives to the Administrative State 
The first way in which these statutes differ from the standard private 
attorney general or public enforcement model is that they are centered on 
regulatory, not adjudicative power. Title VI engages the various levels of 
the administrative state—federal agencies and state and local governments 
who receive federal funds—to adopt rules and policies to promote statutory 
goals of antidiscrimination, inclusion, and equity.130 Title VIII’s 
“affirmatively furthering” provision is similarly directed at federal agencies 
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and grantees; key drafters of the provision announced it as a mechanism to 
engage the federal government’s programmatic, enforcement, and spending 
leverage to promote integration and counter its past history of segregation. 
If Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act mainly creates a private 
mechanism to enforce civil rights, then Title VI, the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act’s other major provision, engages bureaucratic mechanisms for the 
same purpose. Title VI has two obvious strands. First, it provides an 
individual right to be free from discrimination in federally funded 
programs.131 Second, it provides a bureaucratic, non-adjudicative 
mechanism that the federal government can use to enforce 
antidiscrimination norms on subnational levels of government.132 This is 
the carrot-and-stick element of Title VI that commentators acknowledge 
played an instrumental role in integrating southern school districts.133 
Title VI can also be understood in a third way: as a statute focused on 
state power itself. The statute announces an antidiscrimination norm for 
federal funds and it aims to purge states of their complicity in 
discrimination and segregation.134 With the expansion of federal grant-in-
aid programs, federal funds became a new extension of the state, and 
purging these federal funds of discrimination was a key goal for civil rights 
proponents.135 When President Kennedy celebrated the enactment of Title 
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VI, he spoke of a responsibility inherent in federal funding and programs. 
“Simple justice,” Kennedy said, “requires that public funds, to which all 
taxpayers of all races contribute, not be spent in any fashion which 
encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or results in racial discrimination.”136 
Title VIII’s affirmatively furthering fair housing (AFFH) provision137 
is even more explicitly directed at the administrative state—not only 
purging the federal government of its past complicity in segregating and 
subverting fair housing, but also placing on it the affirmative duties to 
reverse course. Key proponents pushed for the provision, building on 
executive orders abolishing discrimination in government run and 
subsidized housing programs, because they saw Title VI (which applied to 
housing programs) as insufficient in failing to place an affirmative duty on 
government.138 
In short, Title VI and Title VIII use administrative, programmatic, and 
regulatory power to promote civil rights. Implementing these statutes, 
agencies can place conditions on federal spending, issue rules and 
guidance, provide technical assistance, and require reporting and self-
evaluation by government grantees. As detailed in Part IV, courts also 
catalyze regulatory implementation and provide a mechanism for 
enforcement of regulations. But what distinguishes these statutory and 
regulatory provisions from the standard models is the breadth of 
administrative tools they employ to promote nondiscrimination, equity, and 
inclusion. While this may be an unremarkable feature of many 
administrative regimes, it has not been a part of standard American civil 
rights statutes. 
b. Positive Directives  
Second, these statutes require state actors to take affirmative steps to 
promote equity or inclusion. Grantees must do more than refrain from 
discrimination or avoid disparate impacts, as required by the central 
provisions of federal fair employment and housing law. Rather, these 
statutes and implementing measures are “directive” in that they require 
state actors to take a series of proactive measures to achieve inclusionary 
goals. Under these specific affirmative directives, state and local actors are 
required to engage in front-end planning to promote equality and inclusion. 
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They must collect racial and ethnic data and conduct impact assessments;139 
conduct outreach to minorities, limited English proficient persons, low-
income groups, and persons with disabilities;140 and propose, evaluate, and 
implement more inclusive alternatives.141 In short, equality directives 
require grantees to take positive steps to ensure that their funding, 
programs, and policies serve to advance integration, nondiscrimination, and 
inclusion. 
In requiring states and localities to take the initiative to assess how 
their programs might further inclusion and equality, these directives bear 
some similarity to measures adopted by other countries that place positive 
duties on state actors. Most prominently, in the United Kingdom, equality 
law places a set of proactive duties on government to achieve equality by 
having “due regard” to eliminate discrimination, promote equality of 
opportunity, and further “good relations” between racial and ethnic 
groups.142 From this general “due regard” duty, public authorities engage in 
a set of more specific activities, including assessing the equality impact of 
their activities, and considering how these impacts might be reduced.143 
c. Pervasive and Embedded 
A final noteworthy aspect of equality directives is that they embed a 
set of equity-promoting requirements in the daily operation of state-funded 
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and state-operated programs by imposing ongoing requirements of self-
evaluation, monitoring, and reporting. For instance, all recipients of federal 
mass transit funds must conduct impact assessments, outreach, and other 
practices to include minority groups, persons with disabilities, and groups 
with limited English proficiency.144 Unlike traditional antidiscrimination 
requirements, these are not admonishments to avoid or remedy bias and 
exclusion. Rather, they are requirements that multi-billion-dollar federal 
programs continuously operate in ways that promote the robust 
participation and inclusion of varied groups. 
In this regard, a key strength of these programs is that the 
requirements are embedded in existing grant programs. These directives 
require the consideration of civil rights or equity concerns as part of the 
ongoing process of receiving and spending federal funds in particular 
programs. When a transit agency or locality takes federal funds, they must 
assess the impacts of existing and proposed programs and policies, conduct 
outreach to include groups in planning and design, and adopt practices that 
promote goals of housing integration and access to transit.145 These duties 
do not depend on filing an administrative or legal complaint, but rather are 
triggered by the receipt of federal funds. These directives draw on the 
spending and oversight relationship that exists between the federal 
government and its subnational grantees. They are implemented primarily 
through that regulatory architecture. 
II 
BEYOND ANTIDISCRIMINATION 
Before providing a more detailed examination of the implementation 
of these directives in housing and transportation, this Part argues that 
equality directives warrant greater attention from those interested in 
promoting social equality and inclusion today. Decrying the failure of civil 
rights laws has become fashionable, even among those interested in 
advancing their goals. Commentators argue that discrimination provides a 
poor explanation for contemporary forms of inequality.146 The thin 
normative goal of preventing discrimination, they argue, should shift 
toward a more robust goal of promoting structural inclusion and 
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opportunity.147 My claim is that equality directives provide an answer, 
relying on existing civil rights law to promote goals that extend beyond 
remedying bias. 
The essential features of equality directives outlined above—that they 
engage broader forms of administrative power, are positive, and are 
pervasive—give thos directives a power beyond the standard 
antidiscrimination model of civil rights. For instance, they engage the 
power of the state at a time when the demise of formal types of state 
exclusion would make it tempting to ignore the continued role of the state 
in shaping inequality.148 Moreover, equality directives harness a broader set 
of regulatory tools than traditional antidiscrimination law, which focuses 
on courts or state adjudicatory power. Equality directives use the state’s 
power to create new programs, oversee existing programs, make rules to 
govern programs and spending, and centralize and dispense information 
and research. 
Significantly, directives do not require wholesale abandonment of 
civil rights responses in favor of social welfare responses to address 
societal inequality.149 They are, after all, creatures of existing civil rights 
statutes. Indeed, they point to the untapped regulatory potential that 
remains in these statutes. Yet equality directives demand that civil rights 
proponents move away from a focus on eradicating bias in courts. In the 
area of race and ethnicity, such a move is particularly crucial given that 
racial inequality is sustained not just by contemporary bias, but also by a 
complex interplay of historic and contemporary bias, poverty, and class-
related disadvantage.150 
A. Regulating the State Itself 
I have noted that equality directives harness different aspects of state 
power than the paradigmatic Title VII model, which focuses on using state 
power to further prosecution and resolution of discrimination claims. Under 
the typical account of Title VII, Congress prohibits discrimination and 
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delegates enforcement to public and private actors, and federal agencies 
have the power to investigate and prosecute claims. The directives on 
which I focus here are centrally about the less celebrated administrative 
tools of advancing civil rights—the powers of spending, rulemaking, and 
oversight. 
The power of this alternative civil rights framework depends on the 
federal government’s capacity to leverage change through its programs. 
Even at a time of greatly diminishing federal resources, such resources are 
rising rather than declining in relative influence. Practically speaking, 
federal spending remains crucial to the sustenance of state and local level 
programs in a broad range of programmatic areas of concern to social 
welfare, particularly housing, transportation, health, and education.151 In 
many areas, federal spending is actually increasing as a percentage of state 
spending.152 Even if federal resources are declining, they still represent 
billions of dollars—a vast set of programs and amount of spending with the 
power to structure equality. For instance, federal spending on transportation 
stands at about ninety-one billion dollars annually, making it one of the 
largest domestic discretionary spending programs.153 Simply put, even in an 
era of tightening budgets, federal grant-in-aid programs remain extensive. 
Thus, attaching equity rules to these programs has great potential to 
promote broad standards of inclusion. 
B. An Emphasis on Structure 
Equality directives also warrant greater attention from those 
concerned about civil rights and equity because the state has the ongoing 
power to structure a complex set of racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic 
arrangements. While the public and private attorney general models of civil 
rights are fundamentally about enhancing the antidiscrimination apparatus, 
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equality directives have the power to intervene to reverse structural and 
persistent forms of inequity. Here, the object of regulation is the state 
itself—or the choices made by state actors about how to structure the 
programs they operate and fund to better advance racial and other forms of 
equality. 
This argument depends on understanding the state’s continuing 
contribution to inequality as well as its potential to redistribute or otherwise 
advance equality. The state’s contribution might seem less important when 
Title VII is the paradigmatic example. But, while some commentators 
argue that changes in private-sphere behavior are most salient for 
promoting equity,154 in my view we should not underemphasize the 
ongoing role of the state. Otherwise, as formalized discrimination by 
government actors has disappeared, the government may recede as an 
important target for addressing inequality. 
In fact, much evidence reveals that while the causes of continued 
racial and ethnic inequality are complex, government decisions play an 
ongoing role. In the housing context, residentially segregated communities 
of concentrated poverty limit or deny residents access to high-quality 
schooling, quality jobs, opportunity networks, and basic elements of public 
safety.155 Funding and programmatic decisions made at the federal, state, 
and local levels influence the cost of transportation for dependent 
populations. Such decisions also structure access to jobs and other 
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opportunities.156 Decisions made on where to locate affordable housing 
affect whether poor families have access to the range of education, tax, 
social capital, and other benefits that accompany location in low-poverty or 
majority White neighborhoods.157 These geographical decisions help 
explain why racial inequality in particular has endured.158 Even macro-level 
changes in determinants of racial inequality that are prompted by 
seemingly race-neutral influences—such as the decline of the industrial or 
blue-collar economy—have racially disparate effects, given spatial forms 
of inequity.159 
Public decisions also influence private forms of discrimination by 
interacting with micro-level private discrimination.160 Modern-day 
employment discrimination is not just individualized or firm-level racial 
discrimination. It also impacts how employers perceive applicants based on 
the confluence of race and the neighborhoods in which they live.161 
Housing discrimination through racial steering is legitimated by the 
racialized landscape of residential neighborhoods as well as the often 
explicit desires of customers and realtors to avoid low-poverty, high-
minority neighborhoods.162 In short, ensuring that public decisions and 
policies operate to promote equity can address enduring problems at the 
intersection of racial, ethnic, and class inequality. 
This account of why the state matters as an object of civil rights 
regulation is most obviously true for race and ethnicity, where the social 
science literature has documented the state’s contribution to persistent 
forms of inequity in housing, transportation, and wealth. It also matters in 
other areas of civil rights and equity regulation such as disability, not only 
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because of federal government complicity, but because of the government’s 
power to leverage change going forward.163 
C. Beyond Bias 
Engaging the state as an equity-promoting actor goes beyond the goal 
of remedying bias, and thus responds to some of the limitations of 
antidiscrimination law in addressing contemporary forms of inequality. By 
bias, I mean the disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals.164 In 
the constitutional context, commentators have long argued that 
antidiscrimination law as constructed by courts has proved too focused on 
questions of intent and malice.165 The doctrinal solutions proposed under 
equal protection—such as requiring public actors to evaluate the extent to 
which their actions promote harm and to consider less harmful 
alternatives166—are precisely the goals of a regime that places positive 
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duties on state actors. The disparate impact component of statutory 
antidiscrimination law could be another avenue for asking these 
questions.167 However, the way in which courts doctrinally construct 
disparate impact law has narrowed its efficacy and scope. For instance, in 
asking whether disparate impacts are justified by institutional necessity, 
courts often grant much deference to institutional decisionmakers.168 Such 
deference likely reflects courts’ reluctance to find public institutions liable 
for decisions that reflect a set of complex tradeoffs.169 Take, for instance, 
Title VI disparate impact cases, in which courts typically have been 
reluctant to find transit agencies liable for funding and service decisions 
that harmed minorities.170 
Equality directives implement the goals of disparate impact law, but 
do so affirmatively and proactively in the planning stages of 
decisionmaking. They require grant recipients to conduct front-end 
assessment of impacts, evaluate alternatives, and include groups not 
normally at the table. This approach thus avoids the back-end problems of 
court enforcement of disparate impact by incorporating an equity and 
inclusionary lens before policies and programs are implemented. In 
requiring upfront assessment, inclusion, and redesign, equality directives 
have the features of a different strand of antidiscrimination law: the 
Americans with Disabilities Act’s requirement of “reasonable 
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accommodation.”171 Yet, as shown by the specific examples presented in 
Part III, equality directives do more than set up broad goals akin to 
“reasonable accommodation”; they require grantees to take a set of specific 
steps of self-assessment, mitigation, and inclusion to meet those goals. 
In moving beyond the prohibitory focus of antidiscrimination law and 
instead encouraging affirmative steps, equality directives provide a broader 
normative frame for civil rights goals than is captured by remedying bias. 
In this Article, I use “equality” or “equity” as a more expansive short hand 
than “antidiscrimination,” to signal that these directives do not simply seek 
to remedy or avoid bias, but also to share federal resources, dismantle long-
standing barriers in the distribution of federal funds, promote integration, 
and further inclusion in policymaking, planning, and services.172 
Finally, this normative shift away from bias has instrumental benefits: 
It responds to the reality that individual or firm bias is at most only one 
contributor to contemporary racial inequality. Some argue that bias is no 
longer pervasive and that it should be demoted as an explanation for 
contemporary racial inequality.173 Even short of this claim,174 too much 
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focus on bias and antidiscrimination risks emphasizing the problems of 
those well positioned to benefit from the removal of formalized barriers to 
equality, while leaving untouched the enduring and embedded problems of 
poverty. Often affecting low-income persons of color, those problems 
include poor access to jobs, high incarceration, and poor social capital.175 
While the private and public attorney general model centers on eradicating 
discrimination and bias primarily in private markets, the regulatory 
directives I describe focus on the state’s contribution to building a 
landscape that provides access and opportunity. For these reasons, equality 
directives provide a potentially powerful mechanism for promoting 
inclusion and opportunity. 
III 
DIRECTIVES FOR HOUSING AND TRANSPORTATION EQUITY 
Believing in the capacity of equality directives requires understanding 
how they have emerged and how they operate in specific contexts. In this 
Part, I begin by providing an account of how these directives arose in the 
areas of transportation and housing—two areas in which the directives are 
more developed and which are particularly salient points of intervention for 
addressing contemporary inequality. This account reveals that Title VI and 
Title VIII provided the statutory framework, but the regulatory 
implementation was prompted by a confluence of public and private 
actions. Such actions included litigation and advocacy by civil rights 
groups, trends in the use of presidential directives to spur agency action and 
create policy, and Supreme Court jurisprudence weakening private 
enforcement. 
While my chief goal in this Part is to describe these developments, 
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organizational culture . . . influence workplace conditions, access, and opportunities for 
advancement over time”). 
  
understanding this history is central to the normative arguments that I 
develop in Part IV. As I explained earlier, civil rights commentators and 
advocates have proved deeply skeptical about administrative agency 
capacity and have celebrated instead the power of private enforcement.176 
The case studies I describe in this Part should give commentators and 
advocates reason to place faith in a regulatory approach as well, because 
private group advocacy pressure has already contributed to the 
development of equality directives and will remain key to their efficacy. In 
addition, a key feature of equality directives is an emphasis on regulatory 
rather than adjudicative power.177 These case studies are intended to 
amplify this point. They show how equality directives are in fact 
implemented at the state and local levels, even in the absence of 
enforcement action or litigation. 
A. Transportation Impact Assessments 
1. Overview 
Transportation policy raises enduring questions of inclusion and 
equality. Decisions on the location, physical accessibility, languages, and 
cost of public transit all determine how individuals and communities will 
be connected to opportunity-enhancing resources such as employment, 
schools, social services, and parks. Such decisions therefore have vast 
consequences for the economic development of communities, the 
environment, and human health. Mobility through public transit serves to 
promote independence and access to resources for persons with 
disabilities.178 For minorities, the distribution and accessibility of 
transportation resources contributes to poverty and joblessness. For 
instance, high-minority, poor communities are often disconnected from 
emerging job centers.179 In addition, transportation policies have had 
profound influence in shaping segregation in metropolitan areas—
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(documenting links between the availability of public transportation and wage inequality in large 
metropolitan areas, since Blacks in particular live farther on average from employment centers). 
  
encouraging White flight from central cities and contributing to 
concentrated, racialized poverty in urban areas.180 
The DOT’s Federal Transit Administration (FTA) provides billions of 
dollars in formula and discretionary funds for buses, subways, railways, 
and other mass transit systems. Administered by the FTA, this money is 
used to build, modernize, and extend transit systems, as well as to subsidize 
transit fares.181 In recent years, the FTA has begun issuing equality 
directives.182 FTA regulations and guidance now require grant recipients to 
assess how their programs and activities impact minority communities and 
to take steps to avert adverse impacts. Specifically, funding recipients must 
integrate into their programs an environmental justice analysis of (1) 
whether their programs and activities have adverse health and 
environmental impacts on minority communities, (2) comparisons between 
effects on minority communities and nonminority communities, and (3) 
documentation of actions taken to mitigate those concerns.183 FTA grant 
recipients must also conduct community outreach to ensure participation of 
minority and LEP communities.184 For mass-transit programs and activities 
in larger regions, DOT requires funding recipients to gather and analyze 
data to evaluate whether minority groups are benefiting fairly from 
federally funded programs and services;185 develop quantitative measures to 
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evaluate whether services are being provided in similar ways to different 
racial and ethnic groups;186 evaluate significant system-wide service and 
fare changes to determine whether they have a discriminatory impact;187 
monitor services every three years to ensure that prior decisions have not 
resulted in disparate impact; and “take corrective action to remedy [any] 
disparities.”188 While “informal,” this guidance is an implementation of 
DOT’s Title VI regulations, and there are possible sanctions for failures to 
comply.189 
In effect, these requirements transform Title VI’s statutory prohibition 
on “discrimination” into a set of affirmative requirements: to conduct an 
equity analysis that analyzes impacts and considers alternatives, and to 
promote full participation. 
2. Emergence 
These directives did not emerge from a single government 
pronouncement. Rather, they emerged over a number of years, from a set of 
regulatory actions and from private group litigation and advocacy. 
First, these regulations were made possible by Title VI litigation and 
complaints brought in the mid-1990s against transit departments before 
Sandoval, most prominently Labor/Community Strategy Center v. Los 
Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, which successfully 
sought redress for claims that the transit system’s funding and policies 
disfavored predominantly minority bus riders.190 Aside from the Los 
Angeles case, much of this litigation was unsuccessful.191 However, these 
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and its regulations. The suit resulted in an eventual consent decree against the transit authority. Id. 
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demands for the full inclusion of racial and ethnic minorities in the 
planning and the distribution of transit resources framed transportation 
equity as a Title VI concern.192 
Second, executive orders promulgated in the late 1990s enabled these 
directives by requiring that federal programs integrate goals related to 
environmental justice and improve access for communities with limited 
English proficiency. Since 1972, grantees under key DOT programs have 
had a duty to certify that they are complying with Title VI’s 
antidiscrimination and disparate impact regulations.193 These rules include 
the standard disparate impact provision, which prohibits recipients from 
“utilizing criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of 
subjecting people to discrimination on the basis of their race, color, or 
national origin.”194 They also require recipients “even in the absence of 
prior discriminatory practice or usage” to “take affirmative action to assure 
that no person is excluded from participation nor denied the benefits” of 
programs based on race or ethnicity.195 
The 2007 revision of the DOT guidelines aims to provide clearer 
guidance and procedures on the meaning of disparate impact.196 It 
implements two executive orders. The first was a 1994 Clinton 
Administration Executive Order directing all federal agencies to integrate 
environmental justice concerns into federal programs by evaluating the 
environmental and human health effects of their programs and policies on 
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minority and low-income communities.197 In addition to affirming existing 
prohibitions on discriminatory actions and those with unjustified 
discriminatory effects,198 the Executive Order requires each agency to 
develop an environmental justice strategy identifying environmental 
effects,199 gather and disseminate specific data,200 and promote public 
participation in decisionmaking and research.201 
DOT’s equality directives also arise from a second executive order, 
issued by the Clinton Administration in 2000 and implemented by federal 
agencies under George W. Bush. The second Order requires federal 
agencies to take affirmative steps to provide “meaningful access” to 
persons with limited English proficiency (LEP).202 As the Order makes 
clear, the “meaningful access” requirement had long been part of Title VI’s 
regulations,203 but the Order requires agencies to develop more specific 
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populations. Id. 
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and Agencies (Feb. 11, 1994) available at 
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rules and guidelines to ensure that funding recipients and federal agencies 
meet this requirement.204 
The final factor in the creation of equality directives in transportation 
was Sandoval itself, which ended private enforcement of Title VI’s 
disparate impact regulations and created the possibility of additional 
administrative complaints against grant recipients. In its 2007 guidance 
requiring impact assessments and greater inclusion of minorities and other 
disadvantaged groups, the agency noted that Sandoval was likely to lead to 
an increase in administrative complaints against the DOT; thus, revision of 
the guidance would assist grantees in preventing disparate impacts.205 
3. Implementation 
These transit directives are becoming embedded in federal, state, and 
local programs, spurring recipients to incorporate equality and inclusionary 
goals at the front-end planning stages. The FTA now implements its 
equality directives by requiring grantees to conduct impact assessments, 
outreach, and mitigation;206 providing technical assistance on how to 
conduct impact assessments;207 supplying information on best practices for 
ensuring outreach and public participation;208 and withholding federal funds 
pending compliance with impact assessments and other measures.209 To 
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DOT financial assistance recipients). 
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to demonstrate that their programs, policies, and activities do not result in a disparate impact on 
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comply with DOT’s equality directives, state and local transit agencies 
must collect demographic data; conduct outreach to include minorities, 
LEP communities, and persons with disabilities; incorporate equity 
assessments of service, fare, and other changes into their transit decisions; 
and adopt measures to mitigate harm to minority and transit-dependent 
populations.210 
Equality directives also prompt transit agencies to include equity 
concerns in the upfront design of their transit system. For example, while 
enforcing equality directives, Chicago researchers, community groups, and 
the public transit authority collaborated to design transit system extensions 
that more effectively meet the needs of minority, transit-dependent, and 
low-income populations.211 The Minneapolis transit agency also included 
an equity analysis in the initial design of a new light rail system, structuring 
the proposed routes to enhance benefits and avoid harm to minority 
communities.212 
In addition, equality directives have led agencies to mitigate harm to 
minority groups when making transit reductions.213 The Washington 
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Metropolitan Area Transit Authority recently conducted a fare and service 
analysis when budget shortfalls forced increases in fares and changes in 
service. After holding public hearings and extending outreach and language 
assistance to LEP populations, the transit system increased fares but 
structured them to mitigate harms to transit-dependent minority and low-
income riders.214 Similarly, the New Jersey Transit Authority—under 
pressure from local advocates to reveal their impact assessments—adopted 
a plan to minimize the effects of fare increases on minority, low-income, 
and transit-dependent populations.215 
As discussed in Part IV, governments and civil society groups can do 
more to strengthen implementation.216 Yet this account of federal oversight 
of transit agencies and integration of the directives by transit agencies 
shows the promise of this new regime. 
B. Furthering Housing Integration 
1. Overview 
Fair housing provides my second example of equality directives. As 
noted above, housing segregation and the location of affordable housing are 
key determinants of social mobility and access to opportunity.217 As I have 
argued elsewhere, dismantling spatial segregation requires the federal 
government to do more than advance nondiscrimination and reduce private 
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market bias—it also requires the government to use its regulatory and 
programmatic power to promote integrated affordable housing 
opportunities.218 
Equality directives in housing aim to use federal power to promote 
these goals of nondiscrimination and integration. State and local 
governments that receive federal community development funds must 
evaluate public and private obstacles to achieving fair housing in their 
communities and take steps to reduce those obstacles. These regulatory 
requirements, adopted in 1995, are known as the “analysis of 
impediments.” They apply to Community Development Block Grants, one 
of the largest sources of federal funding for the revitalization of low-
income communities.219 A HUD manual implementing these regulations 
provides guidance on the range of ways that grantees can meet these 
obligations, specifying both how to collect and analyze data and how to 
structure programs to better promote integration and nondiscrimination.220 
These regulations and informal guidance proved central in a recent case 
holding Westchester County liable for failing to comply with its statutory 
duty to affirmatively further fair housing under Title VIII.221 
2. Emergence 
The statutory backdrop here is Title VIII’s requirement that federal 
agencies and federal grantees “affirmatively further” fair housing.222 This 
provision responds to past federal complicity in creating segregation; 
evidence shows that key drafters of the provision sought greater 
engagement by federal actors to combat private market discrimination and 
to use federal programs to promote integration.223 Yet the federal 
government did little to enforce the provision until spurred by litigation in 
the 1970s. At that time, advocates relied on the provision to challenge 
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HUD’s past history of creating racial segregation in public housing, as well 
as ongoing siting practices by HUD and local grantees that operated to 
further racial segregation. The result was a set of important lower court 
cases holding that HUD’s duty to further fair housing required HUD to 
promote integration in locating public and subsidized housing.224 HUD 
complied by promulgating its first set of regulations on racialized site 
selection, which prohibited federally funded projects from furthering 
segregation (or “minority concentration”) unless necessary to meet an 
“overriding need” for housing in the target community.225 
More than twenty years later, the Clinton Administration issued an 
order giving further life to the statutory directive. The 1994 Executive 
Order directs federal agencies to further fair housing in the design of their 
policies and the administration of their programs.226 More specifically, one 
order directs HUD to require grantees to analyze “impediments” to fair 
housing.227 HUD now requires that communities seeking to receive grants 
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See BONASTIA, supra note 110, at 128 (providing an account of the effect of the decision on HUD 
policy). 
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sanctions. See Exec. Order No. 12,892, 59 Fed. Reg. 2939 (Jan. 17, 1994) (implementing 
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of Impediments (AI) directive also stems from legislation requiring community development 
grantees to further fair housing. Specifically, in 1983, Congress required that all grantees 
receiving community development block grant funds certify that they would affirmatively further 
fair housing. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 
Stat. 633 (codified as amended in scattered titles and sections of U.S.C.). Congress required 
certification in another HUD affordable housing program in 1990. See Cranston-Gonzalez 
National Affordable Housing Act of 1990 (NAHA), 42 U.S.C. § 12705(b)(15)–(16) (2006) 
(requiring certification); id. § 12704(21) (defining certification). 
  
under major housing affordability and community development programs228 
submit an AFFH certification,229 analyze “impediments to fair housing 
choice within the jurisdiction,” “take appropriate actions to overcome the 
effects of any impediments identified through that analysis,” and “maintain 
[relevant] records.”230 
3. Implementation 
As in the area of transportation, federal, state, and local actors are 
taking steps to implement the fair housing equality directive. At the federal 
level, HUD implements the directive by providing guidance on how 
communities can proactively promote fair housing. HUD’s Fair Housing 
Planning Guide requires that entities, when conducting their analysis of 
impediments, assess how relevant laws and policies affect the availability, 
location, and accessibility of housing and review all conditions affecting 
fair housing choice on the basis of race, ethnicity, disability, and other 
categories.231 The Planning Guide requires that jurisdictions take a regional 
approach to fair housing planning (which is intended to further integration 
within metropolitan areas), establish procedures for public input, and 
conduct effective data analysis.232 The Planning Guide then requires 
jurisdictions to take actions to address these impediments, though, as I 
discuss in greater detail below, the Planning Guide’s language could be 
more directive on the details of the specific actions that must be taken.233 
The Planning Guide also provides examples of best practices and 
model interventions to address impediments to fair housing, including 
creating local fair housing commissions,234 enacting legislation mandating 
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 In 1995, HUD consolidated the Community Development Block Grant Program (CDBG) 
with other housing affordability and community development programs, requiring specifically 
that communities submit what is known as the Consolidated Plan. Consolidated Submission for 
Community Planning and Development Programs, 60 Fed. Reg. 1896, 1897 (Jan. 5, 1995) 
(codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 91, § 91.2 (2012)). 
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 See infra text accompanying notes 261–262 (discussing areas where the Fair Housing 
Planning Guide leaves much discretion to grantees). 
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 FAIR HOUSING PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 2, at 3-13. 
  
pro-integrative site selection for affordable housing in localities,235 
increasing funding for local fair housing and human rights agencies,236 
adopting laws prohibiting source of income discrimination,237 creating 
housing accessibility and inclusionary zoning ordinances,238 working with 
local groups to establish fair housing testing programs,239 and providing 
mobility assistance for housing voucher recipients.240 
HUD’s most recent guidance to grantees expands on the Planning 
Guide by requiring grant recipients to adopt a comprehensive regional 
approach to dismantling racial and economic segregation and to promoting 
housing integration.241 Research and practice show that the problem of 
racialized concentration of poverty requires solutions at the regional level. 
Segregation is manifest not only in terms of racial and economic 
differences between neighborhoods, but also in the spatial divide between 
suburbs and cities.242 Indeed, political and geographical boundaries are 
often shaped and defined by economic and racial segregation.243 In that 
vein, HUD requires federal grantees to work not just within geographically 
defined barriers but also in conjunction with other localities to remove 
barriers to segregation. Specifically, grantees must conduct a regional 
equity assessment to identify areas of racial and ethnic segregation and 
racially concentrated areas of poverty;244 understand the demographic 
trends and the forces driving segregation; identify disparities in access to 
opportunities such as quality schools, jobs, and stable housing;245 and take 
steps at the regional level to address segregation and disparities in 
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the FHA. 
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 See id. at 23; Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in 
Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1844 (1994) (introducing the argument that political 
and jurisdictional boundaries can promote racially unequal distributions of political and economic 
resources). 
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 ADDRESSING EQUITY, supra note 241, at 7. “Racially Concentrated Areas of Poverty” are 
defined as census tracks that are a majority non-White and have family poverty rates of more than 
forty percent. Id. at 14. 
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 Id. at 18. HUD has created five indices for identifying access to opportunity: “School 
Proficiency Index, Poverty Index, Labor Market Index, Housing Stability Index, [and] Job Access 
Index.” Id. at 19. 
  
opportunity.246 
Notably, this recent guidance articulates goals beyond 
antidiscrimination, specifying that grantees “do more than just combat 
discrimination”; they must work towards equity and opportunity.247 The 
aim is to create “geographies of opportunity”: locations that “effectively 
connect people to jobs, quality public schools,” and other resources 
necessary for social and economic advancement.248 This guidance 
illustrates the approach of equality directives by providing a location for 
proactive planning and policymaking towards goals of substantive 
inclusion and equality. 
At the state and local levels, grantees are beginning to engage in 
programs and policies to affirmatively further fair housing goals. The HUD 
Fair Housing Planning Guide provides examples of specific states, 
including Montana, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Indiana, that have used the 
analysis of impediments and affirmatively furthering directives to engage 
in fair housing planning, identify key obstacles to fair housing, and map 
responsive solutions.249 Planning professionals and community members 
have lauded localities in Illinois, Tennessee, Ohio, and Nevada for 
developing robust analyses of impediments in recent years.250 
Massachusetts has built on HUD’s equality directives to undertake in 
vigorous fair housing planning and programming. For instance, the state 
gives priority funding to projects and communities that meet certain fair 
housing criteria. Those criteria include: creating affordable racially and 
ethnically inclusive housing; accommodating persons with disabilities; and 
using federal funds to provide housing search assistance to help link 
families receiving vouchers to housing opportunities in low-poverty, 
integrated neighborhoods.251 The state has also required localities seeking 
federal housing funding to develop an affirmative fair housing program 
with particular elements, including strengthening the fair housing 
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 See Michael Allen, No Certification, No Money: The Revival of Civil Rights Obligations in 
HUD Funding Programs, 78 PLAN. COMMISSIONERS J. 16, 17 (2010) (citing as exemplary the 
Naperville, Illinois analysis of impediments); see also Daniel Lauber, Analyses of Impediments to 
Fair Housing Choice, PLAN./COMM., http://www.planningcommunications.com (follow 
“Analyses of Impediments to Fair Housing” hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 18, 2012) (describing a 
planning consultant’s examples of analyses of impediments he helped produce in Naperville, 
Illinois and in localities in Tennessee, Ohio, and Nevada). 
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 See MASS. DEP’T OF HOUS. & CMTY. DEV., AFFIRMATIVE FAIR HOUSING AND CIVIL 
RIGHTS POLICY 22, 24–25 (2010), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/hed/docs/dhcd/hd/fair/affirmativefairhousingp.pdf (detailing civil rights 
initiatives and specifying programs and policies required of localities). 
  
compliance infrastructure; developing site selection and land use policies 
that promote affordable housing; conducting outreach to underrepresented 
groups; eliminating local residency preferences; and reforming 
exclusionary zoning practices.252 
In short, the fair housing equality directives require states and 
localities receiving community development funds to further fair housing 
by identifying public and private barriers to achieving fair housing and by 
using their leverage and expertise to overcome those barriers. This leverage 
includes the government’s control over programs, funding, and legislation; 
its ability to gather and analyze data; its role as a convener; and its potential 
access to funding and other resources. Under this model, fair housing 
becomes a pervasive goal of government-funded community development 
programs. 
IV 
TAKING EQUALITY DIRECTIVES SERIOUSLY 
Thus far, I have argued that the existence of American equality 
directives should prompt academic commentators to rethink the 
fundamental structure of American civil rights regulation. Civil rights law 
depends not only on adjudicatory power, but also on regulatory and 
programmatic power. In bringing attention to these directives, I hope to 
reshape civil rights commentary now dominated by accounts of court 
decisions. I hope to make equality directives more central to the study and 
teaching of civil rights law. 
I have argued above that my account has implications not just for 
scholars but also for the real-world practice of antidiscrimination and 
equity. In this final Part, I direct my arguments to those who might 
implement these equality directives. The case studies on housing and 
transportation reveal an emerging effort to develop and implement equality 
directives. They suggest a basis for faith in a regulatory approach, despite 
the real constraints of administrative agencies. 
In this Part, I show what government actors and private groups might 
do to strengthen the equality directive regime. I am not arguing that these 
models should supplant existing antidiscrimination law, nor do I want to 
suggest that equality directives are a solution to all existing 
antidiscrimination and inequity problems. I contend only that much more 
can be done to harness their capacity. Implementation of these directives 
will require government oversight and creative and persistent advocacy by 
private groups, including litigation and policy advocacy. 
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I begin this Part with ways to strengthen equality directives 
themselves, balancing their emphasis on flexibility and process-based 
solutions with the need to ensure that these equality directives achieve 
results. I then turn to strengthening the role of government actors in 
overseeing and implementing these directives, a crucial part of which 
depends on prodding by private actors. Finally, I turn to how private groups 
can strengthen and expand emerging implementation efforts, relying on 
traditional forms of administrative and court enforcement where possible—
but also, crucially, non-litigation forms of advocacy and implementation. 
My faith in the approach ultimately depends on private group engagement 
with the directives: Civil rights groups, community organizers, and policy 
advocates can help spur implementation, enhance the capacity of equality 
directives, and thereby help transform civil rights practice to better promote 
equity and social inclusion. 
A. Strengthening Directives 
A key strength of equality directives is that they emphasize regulatory 
forms not typically associated with civil rights law—an emphasis on 
process and flexibility, as described below. Yet, equality directives are also 
nested within a compliance frame: the carrot and stick of the Spending 
Clause. Implementing equality directives requires balancing flexibility and 
innovation with incentives to ensure compliance. My aim here is not to 
prescribe a particular formula for equality directives: The correct balance 
of incentives and flexibility for individual directives should be tailored to 
the particular circumstances and developed through an interchange among 
government, regulated actors, and private parties. But here I lay out some 
key considerations to guide this development going forward. I also address 
some potential constitutional concerns with directives. 
1. Balancing Procedural and Substantive Goals 
Equality directives emphasize a set of procedural planning 
mechanisms (impact assessment, evaluation of alternatives, and 
participation) as a means of furthering substantive equity goals. This 
emphasis on self-assessment and participation is a key strength of the 
approach. Indeed, the procedural “means” is intertwined with the 
substantive ends: inclusion. In fact, the harm repeatedly identified by 
transportation equity advocates is the failure to include people of color, 
people with disabilities, and others in the planning, design, and 
implementation of policies and programs.253 
 
 
253
 Thomas Sanchez and Marc Brenman begin their definition of transportation equity with the 
  
In addition, integrating equity and inclusionary concerns during front-
end planning, before a decision is made, has advantages over the traditional 
method of civil rights regulation. In other contexts, commentators have 
found that regulatory intervention at the planning stage allows the regulated 
actors—who have the most information about the problem—to devise 
standards and goals, rather than imposing government standards through 
top-down regulation.254 Regimes that allow for innovation and 
experimentation can also promote the development of effective solutions in 
cases of regulatory uncertainty—that is, when the regulator, regulated 
party, and private parties are unclear about the proper solution.255 Beyond 
the advantages of expertise and innovation, front-end planning helps 
promote stakeholder buy-ins and compliance.256 Similarly, with equality 
directives, front-end planning with an equity lens may yield better results 
than federal mandates or retrospective evaluation by courts and agencies. 
Equality directives can help jurisdictions tailor solutions to local 
conditions, creating solutions that may have more legitimacy with 
grantees.257 
This emphasis on procedural interventions is a strength, yet equality 
directives will in some instances benefit from more specific delineation of 
the procedural steps that grantees should take. These rules will differ in 
particular contexts and must be tailored to the needs of particular areas 
(e.g., transportation, housing, agriculture, or criminal justice, among 
others). For instance, transportation advocates have sought more specific 
 
concept of ensuring “opportunities for meaningful involvement in the transportation planning 
process.” SANCHEZ ET AL., supra note 156, at 8; see also id. at 115 (describing disability groups’ 
emphasis on inclusion in policy and planning). 
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Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691, 693–94 (2003) 
(conducting case studies in the area of food safety, industrial safety, and environmental protection 
to support an account of “management-based regulation”—a regime that directs regulated entities 
to engage in a planning process to achieve public goals). 
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MICH. L. REV. 1265 (2012) (discussing the emergence of contextualizing regimes: regulatory 
regimes that structure engagement by various stakeholders to address public problems 
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 Cf. Sabel & Simon, supra note 255, at 1308 (describing contextualizing regimes as 
beginning with broad norms that evolve and are refined after investigation and deliberation); 
Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation 
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1069 (2004) (discussing, in the context of public law 
remedies, “rolling-rule regime[s]”—provisional rules that “incorporate a process of reassessment 
and revision with continuing stakeholder participation”). 
  
guidance to grantees on the methodology for conducting impact 
assessments.258 Similarly, fair housing advocates have asked HUD to revise 
its AFFH regulations to require more specific metrics for measuring 
progress towards fair housing goals.259 
2. Suggesting and Directing 
As discussed above, equality directives must balance the benefits of 
flexibility and innovation with methods that ensure compliance by 
grantees. This is achieved in part through the penalty aspects of the 
enforcement regime, specifically the possibility of fund termination. 
Beyond imposing hard constraints and remedies, equality directives might 
also promote compliance by providing greater clarity in the requirements 
they place on grantees. 
As an example, the FTA’s equality directives mandate inclusion, but 
only recommend a set of “[e]ffective practices,” making clear that 
“[r]ecipients and subrecipients have wide latitude to determine how, when, 
and how often specific public involvement measures should take place, and 
what specific measures are most appropriate.”260 While the FTA mandates 
impact assessments, no guidance specifies the methodology for 
determining impacts. Additionally, although “major” changes require 
impact assessments, the agency lets grantees define what is “major.”261 
HUD’s Fair Housing Planning Guide similarly leaves to grantees the 
determination of what constitutes a fair housing barrier, whom to include in 
planning, proper data collection methods, and appropriate remedies.262 
Some latitude permits innovation, tailoring, and flexibility. Yet 
equality directives should delineate specific, effective methodologies for 
conducting impact assessments or analyzing barriers to fair housing, and 
should provide strong incentives for grantees to adopt such approaches. For 
communities seeking to remedy impediments to fair housing, for instance, 
equality directives might require jurisdictions to certify that they have 
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to 2-24 (providing a framework for an analysis of impediments analysis and the development of a 
remedial plan). 
  
eliminated the most common barriers to fair housing or adopted proven 
best practices. In general, equality directives should allow tailoring of 
solutions by grantees, but they should also strengthen incentives and 
guidance to ensure that grantees adopt effective methods for promoting 
equality and inclusion.263 The balance between these two goals will need to 
be developed in specific contexts, with the input of civil rights 
organizations, community groups, the private sector, state and local 
governments, and other groups. Consistent with this strategy, civil rights 
groups have sought to shape more specific AFFH regulatory guidelines.264 
3. Addressing Constitutional Concerns 
It is worth noting that equality directives, in requiring the affirmative 
consideration of race and ethnicity, may spark constitutional concerns. A 
powerful feature of the regime is that many of these directives condition 
federal spending—and thus depend at least in part on Congress’s Spending 
Power.265 To date, the Court has construed the Spending Clause to allow 
Congress broad power to regulate as long as Congress avoids violating 
other constitutional provisions such as the Equal Protection Clause.266 
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 Apart from the Fair Housing Act, the directives I have highlighted emerge from statutes 
that are the proper exercise of Congress’s Spending Power. This is clear because (1) underlying 
programs promote the general welfare in providing transportation, housing, and other services; 
(2) the conditions imposed are related to the federal interest in ensuring that all groups fairly 
benefit from federal programs and funding; and (3) the conditions are not unduly coercive for 
states and localities. See S. Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207, 211, 217–18 (1987) (discussing 
direct limitations on the Spending Power and upholding Congress’s conditioning of federal 
highway funds on state adoption of a 21-year-old drinking age); see also Barnes v. Gorman, 536 
U.S. 181, 185 (2002) (“Title VI invokes Congress’s power under the Spending Clause, U.S. 
Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, to place conditions on the grant of federal funds.”).  
The Supreme Court’s recent decision finding that Congress’s expansion of the federal 
Medicaid program—conditioned on states’ loss of federal Medicaid funds—violates the Spending 
  
Some may raise concerns about whether equality directives risk running 
afoul of the Equal Protection Clause.267 On this score, the Supreme Court’s 
recent decisions point to a tension between the disparate impact standard 
and the Equal Protection Clause.268 However, equality directives only 
require that racial and ethnic harms be taken into consideration in the 
planning and design of program and policy. Given that equality directives 
do not require the adoption of an explicitly race-conscious action, they 
should not run afoul of current understandings of the Equal Protection 
Clause.269 
 
Power is unlikely to alter this analysis for at least four reasons. See National Fed. of Indep. Bus. 
v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604–06 (2012) (finding Congress’s conditioning of Medicaid 
expansion on termination of all federal Medicaid funds unduly coercive). First, the Court 
reaffirmed the core holding of Dole that the federal government may place conditions on grants to 
states. See id. at 2604–05 (explaining and distinguishing Dole). Second, few programs will have 
the reach of Medicaid, which accounts for a substantial twenty percent of state budgets. See id. at 
2604 (also noting that federal money covers fifty to eighty-three percent of those costs). By 
contrast, transportation spending—as important as it is in providing jobs, services, and mobility—
accounts for 7.7% of state budgets, about one third of which comes from federal funds. See 
NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, FISCAL YEAR 2010 STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT 5, 
62 (2011), available at 
http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/2010%20State%20Expenditure%20Report.pdf. 
Accordingly, a court is unlikely to find termination of funds for failure to comply with federal 
conditions under these programs unduly coercive. See National Fed. of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 
2604 (finding Medicaid changes to be more than mere inducement for state compliance but 
effectively a “gun to the head”). Third, unlike with the Medicaid Expansion, an agency’s ability 
to terminate funds under equality directives extends only to the specific program that is 
noncompliant, rather than independent programs. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2006) (limiting 
fund termination “to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom 
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such noncompliance has been so found”). Finally, Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act addresses 
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five of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727–
28 (2003) (“Congress may enact so-called prophylactic legislation [under the enforcement clauses 
of the Fourteenth Amendment] that proscribes facially constitutional conduct, in order to prevent 
and deter unconstitutional conduct.”). 
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 Cf. Sheila R. Foster, Environmental Justice & the Constitution, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,347, 
10,350 (2009) (arguing prior to Ricci that environmental justice provisions that forbid actions 
with an unjustified impact do not contain the type of “‘racial classification’ that federal courts 
have been willing to find justifies strict judicial scrutiny of such policies”). 
  
B. Enhancing Government Implementation 
Equality directives depend in large part on the capacity and will for 
development of these directives at the federal level, as well as the 
implementation of these directives by federal, state, and local actors. In this 
section, I explain that the existing system of oversight contains strong 
incentives for states and localities to comply. At the same time, I show how 
the system might be strengthened. Any suggestions I make here are 
necessarily intertwined with private implementation, which I address in the 
following section. Strong government oversight and implementation will 
certainly depend on prompting by private actors using a range of advocacy 
tools. 
1. Oversight Structure 
A system of federal agency review backs an equality directive regime, 
with possible sanctions for failure to comply. For instance, transportation-
funding recipients are required to certify their compliance with Title VI 
annually. Every three years, they are required to submit a detailed report to 
the Department of Transportation documenting disparate impact 
assessments and mitigation efforts taken in response to found impacts, and 
providing a record of Title VI complaints and litigation.270 Failure to adhere 
to regulatory requirements can lead to a finding that a funding recipient is 
“deficient.”271 The Title VI report is then returned to the grantee for 
improvement. Grantees are deemed “noncompliant” if they engage in 
practices that have the “purpose or effect of denying persons the benefits 
of” the grantee’s services, or discriminatorily “exclude” individuals or 
groups.272 A finding of noncompliance allows the agency to withhold 
federal funds pending resolution of the matter, or to begin a process to 
terminate federal funding.273 Similarly, HUD requires an annual 
certification from community development grantees that they are 
affirmatively furthering fair housing.274 
 The actual strength of this formal regime depends on agency 
willingness to conduct civil rights reviews and to threaten federal funds 
termination for failure to do so. In the wake of litigation in Westchester to 
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enforce the fair housing directives,275 for instance, HUD has started to 
initiate civil rights reviews of state and local grantees—even apart from 
prompting through private complaints or legal action.276 As an example, 
HUD recently found that Marin County, California, had failed to meet its 
obligation to affirmatively further fair housing. In particular, the County 
had received community development funds, but a review by HUD showed 
that the County failed to promote fair housing and inclusion, ensure 
meaningful citizen participation, and provide adequate accessibility for 
persons with disabilities.277 In the end, the County signed a voluntary 
agreement with HUD that required it to affirmatively market affordable 
housing to minorities and persons with disabilities; to complete an analysis 
of impediments to fair housing; and to increase outreach and services to 
racial and ethnic minorities, those with limited English speaking 
proficiency, and to persons with disabilities.278 HUD also recently 
threatened to terminate $10 million in federal funding to a parish in 
Louisiana due to the racially and ethnically discriminatory effect of the 
parish’s proposed restrictions on multifamily occupancy.279 In response, the 
parish rescinded the proposed rules.280 Similarly, HUD withheld $1.7 
billion in federal funds from Texas for failing to adhere to AFFH 
requirements.281 Because state and local grant recipients are a relatively 
small set of repeat players who interact with federal agencies, even a few 
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such enforcement actions may spur greater compliance by grantees. 
2. Addressing Constraints 
Relying on federal agencies and executive power also presents 
challenges. The level of civil rights enforcement may vary by presidential 
administration. This constraint is potentially significant, but should not be 
overstated. For instance, the Bush administration—generally perceived as 
less supportive of civil rights—expanded DOT’s equality directives.282 The 
Bush Administration also reissued the analysis of impediments guidance 
and the Fair Housing Planning Guide, “remind[ing]” jurisdictions of the 
need to update their analyses of impediments and of the relevant fair 
housing regulations.283 Moreover, once established, equality directives can 
be sustained by their own political economy, making wholesale 
abandonment of their goals less likely. The structure of equality directives 
allows diffusion of goals at the state and local levels, which allows buy-in 
by a wide array of willing state and local stakeholders. This diffusion in 
turn allows the development of interest group pressure to implement such 
goals.284  
A related challenge is that federal agencies vary in their capacity to 
further inclusionary norms, and some even have regulatory interests that 
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run counter to civil rights and equity concerns.285 Importantly, this 
challenge stems from what I have previously identified as a strength of the 
equality directives approach.286 Equality directives’ power lies in their 
“embeddedness” in federal agencies that distribute funding, oversee 
programs, and have rulemaking authority—agencies like the DOT and 
HUD—rather than agencies that are dedicated to addressing civil rights, 
like the EEOC. 
Yet this embedded strength can prove a constraint when civil rights 
goals are not a federal agency’s priority. Addressing this constraint requires 
supporting the civil rights capacity of the agencies by, for instance, 
expanding staff and other resources to conduct oversight and provide 
technical assistance. Particular equality directives might require revision to 
incorporate increased oversight and reporting. For instance, the 
Government Accounting Office (GAO) recently recommended a set of 
changes to improve the efficacy of the analysis of impediments process. In 
its recommendations, the GAO advised that HUD should not only increase 
oversight, but also promulgate regulations requiring periodic updating of 
the analysis of impediments and submission for reviews of the same by 
HUD.287 
In short, increasing support and funding for government oversight and 
implementation is crucial. This is true not simply at the federal level, but at 
all levels of government. The question is how to create incentives to more 
fully implement the regime. The best answer, I believe, lies in private 
group advocacy. Private groups must engage these directives—by 
explaining their benefits in particular substantive areas, pushing for 
expansion where appropriate, and advocating for greater funding, 
implementation, and oversight at all levels of government. As I show in the 
next section, I see promising efforts emerging upon which civil society 
groups might expand. 
C. Expanding Private Group Engagement 
Agency-driven oversight is only one way of ensuring that these 
directives are brought to life. Depending on agency enforcement presents 
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the risk of paper compliance—merely ensuring that grantees have 
completed paperwork certifying their compliance with Title VI or AFFH 
directives. Moreover, lacking resources or will, agencies might fail to take 
further steps to evaluate whether grantees have met substantive goals. In 
addition, relying on administrative review is likely to generate little 
enthusiasm from civil society groups traditionally interested in rights 
enforcement. Even with the benefits I have articulated, such a system 
compares poorly to courts if it operates without the support of private civil 
society groups. From this vantage point, an administrative enforcement 
regime that leaves little room for private engagement will seem thin. 
For these reasons, I see private group engagement as a vital part of the 
equality directive regime. Building on existing efforts to enforce and 
implement these directives can occur through traditional forms of private 
attorney general-type enforcement, as I describe below. But private 
implementation of equality directives should not be limited to traditional 
forms of enforcement. Equality directives’ success depends on civil rights 
groups using a variety of advocacy tools to further implementation. Success 
also depends on civil rights groups engaging with community-based 
groups, particularly at the state and local levels. 
1. Harnessing the Private Attorney General 
Where possible, private advocates should use traditional litigation 
tools and administrative enforcement to encourage states and localities to 
comply with equality directives, to create incentives for broader 
compliance, and to strengthen the scope of equality directives. Promising 
efforts are already emerging. 
a. Litigation 
A New York–based fair housing group recently brought suit to 
enforce the fair housing equality directives in Westchester County, New 
York. As previously noted, Supreme Court jurisprudence limiting implied 
private rights of action inhibits litigation to enforce equality directives.288 In 
the Westchester case, the plaintiffs effectively surmounted this doctrinal 
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challenge by relying on a novel argument. They argued that Westchester’s 
annual certifications to the federal government, which stated that it had 
complied with the equality directives, were “false” within the meaning of 
the False Claims Act.289 The district court substantially accepted the 
plaintiffs’ arguments and granted them partial summary judgment. The 
judgment held that the County failed to conduct a proper analysis of 
impediments or take action to address racial discrimination and segregation 
within the County.290 With the help of HUD, the parties negotiated a 
consent decree that remains subject to monitoring by the district court. 
It may be too early to deem the case a complete success. Positively, 
the consent decree requires Westchester to pay $30 million to the federal 
government, $21.6 million of which would be placed in a HUD account 
specifically for the purpose of developing integrated housing in the 
County.291 The settlement also requires the County to spend $30 million to 
build affordable housing in communities with low minority populations.292 
At the same time, as of this writing, the plaintiffs’ counsel contend that the 
County and the court-appointed monitor have taken insufficient action to 
comply with the decree.293 
However, in significant ways the case has already strengthened the 
fair housing equality directive regime. For example, in holding Westchester 
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County liable, the opinion makes clear that states and localities need to do 
more than paper compliance with equality directives; they must do a 
meaningful analysis of impediments to fair housing and take remedial 
action. This ruling will thus likely affect jurisdictions beyond Westchester 
County. More than one thousand state and local grantees under the 
community development block grant program must certify that they are 
furthering fair housing,294 must implement a more robust meaning of that 
certification, and may face consequences—adverse litigation and 
administrative action—for failing to further those goals.295 A stable set of 
repeat players means that actors should have institutional incentives to 
further the equality directive’s goals. Grantees regularly receive state and 
local federal funding (in this case through the Community Development 
and Block Grant Program), interact with federal administrators about the 
funding proposals,296 and engage in learning networks with each other.297 
Relatedly, in its actions surrounding the case, the federal government 
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conveyed that it would take enforcement of the regulatory directives more 
seriously. HUD not only helped broker the settlement, but also vowed to 
strengthen the fair housing regulations and to enforce them more 
vigorously.298 
Finally, the case mobilized private actors. For instance, it prompted 
advocacy from fair housing groups that previously focused mainly on 
private litigation in individual cases.299 One effect of the case was to reveal 
to fair housing groups the potential gains of increased attention to these 
equality directives. National, state, and local housing groups have banded 
together to press for a broader revision of the AFFH rules. They advocate 
for a more specific set of goals and requirements on housing and urban 
development grant recipients.300 
b. Administrative Enforcement 
Private groups can also participate in enforcement of the equality 
directives through administrative complaint mechanisms at both federal 
and state levels. The success of administrative complaints depends in 
substantial part on agency willingness to process them and take them 
seriously. Private groups need to engage in advocacy to ensure such 
enforcement occurs. A recent complaint against a local transit agency 
provides a powerful example of the potential of such complaints to prompt 
compliance by grantees. 
In 2009, several San Francisco Bay Area groups filed a Title VI 
complaint against the Bay Area Regional Transit Authority (BART), which 
operates the public rail system that connects San Francisco, California with 
the surrounding East Bay and Northern San Mateo counties. BART sought 
to extend the transit system using regional revenue, $70 million in stimulus 
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funds,301 and loans from the DOT.302 The groups argued that the system 
extension would not adequately service public transit–dependent low-
income and minority populations of East Oakland and that it would ignore 
the environmental impacts on communities of color.303 In their complaint to 
the Federal Transit Agency, the groups alleged that BART failed to prepare 
the required service and fare equity analyses as required by DOT’s equality 
directive304 or to conduct a proper analysis of disparate impact.305 Agreeing 
that BART’s impact analyses were insufficient, the DOT reallocated $70 
million from the airport connection project to other BART projects.306 
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The BART case illustrates the power of the administrative complaint 
process as a means of enforcing equality directives. Much like the 
Westchester example, this case renders a seemingly procedural requirement 
into a tool for meaningful change. Namely, it requires a meaningful impact 
assessment that incorporates appropriate data and effective methodology 
and that adequately considers alternatives. Moreover, in withholding funds 
from the project, the agency showed its willingness to impose sanctions for 
failing to comply with the equality directive. The significance of the 
enforcement action will likely extend well beyond BART, prompting more 
robust compliance by transit agencies with the equality directives and 
pursuit of the goals that they represent. 
Civil society groups, too, have leveraged the BART case in important 
ways. For instance, they have used it to promote improvements in DOT’s 
impact assessment process and to argue that DOT should revise the 
guidance it gives to grantees.307 The FTA has so far declined to revise its 
rules. However, the FTA did issue a written notice to all funding recipients, 
affirming the need to follow the Circular’s specific directive to assess the 
impacts of service and fare changes.308 
2. Becoming the Private Implementer 
Litigation and administrative action are thus important forms of 
intervention to enforce and implement equality directives. They should not, 
however, be the only tools used to implement equality directives. In part, 
this is justified by the practical reasons I have previously mentioned—the 
constraints of private and administrative enforcement mechanisms.309 Even 
apart from these constraints, equality directives present an opportunity to 
use a broader range of advocacy tools. Equality directives thus provide a 
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mechanism for broadening the practice of civil rights law—extending it 
beyond adjudicative enforcement and connecting civil rights groups to the 
work of community-based groups. I show below an emerging practice to 
enforce equality directives lying at the intersection of civil rights law—
with its traditional focus on court-enforced rights—and community-based 
policy advocacy. As I explain, civil society groups are already undertaking 
efforts to implement existing equality directives, to expand their meaning 
and efficacy, and to oversee state and federal implementation of their 
objectives. 
One component of this work is sharing model interventions with state 
and local governments and other advocacy groups. For instance, groups 
have begun to publish reports showing whether states and localities 
effectively promote fair housing in federally funded programs and to gather 
concrete examples of innovative interventions.310 Similarly, transportation 
advocates and researchers publicize model impact assessments and 
effective interventions in transportation equity, such as efforts to include 
minority groups in public participation and planning.311 Stakeholders can 
use these efforts as a roadmap to creatively use federal fair housing funds. 
Advocates can use information about best practices to pressure less 
enthusiastic states and localities. 
Another aspect of this work involves urging federal-level actors to 
monitor and enforce equality directives. Advocates are encouraging federal 
government actors to issue more specific equality rules, strengthen 
oversight of state and local grantees, and sanction noncompliant states and 
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localities.312 This will entail the familiar work of federal level advocacy—
publishing letters and issuing reports, meeting with agency and 
congressional officials, and generating public awareness. Relatedly, civil 
society groups can show how state and local governments are falling short 
of the requirements and goals of the equality directives. In the area of 
transportation, these groups highlight the lack of public participation and 
the failure to include minorities and women in transportation planning.313 
They also advocate for improvements in federally subsidized public 
transit.314 In housing, they evaluate whether states and localities have 
completed analyses of impediments and comprehensively analyzed barriers 
to fair housing. Advocates also continue to monitor whether governments 
are taking steps to overcome their identified impediments.315 
Equality directives are relatively new, and so too is this advocacy. 
Thus, its ultimate success remains to be seen. Yet advocates on the ground 
are beginning to incorporate these directives into their broader advocacy 
strategies. In this vein, national organizations have begun to instruct their 
state and local partners on how to make use of equality directives. In the 
area of fair housing, for instance, the National Low Income Housing 
Coalition (NLIHC)—a group of low-income housing advocates and 
providers—guides its members on enforcement of the analysis of 
impediments required in their jurisdictions. In its guide to low-income 
housing advocacy, the group explains the regulatory requirements and the 
process for devising analyses of impediments. The NLIHC guide also 
provides examples showing advocates how to use HUD’s Fair Housing 
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Planning Guide in their work,316 including participating in the development 
of analyses of impediments, monitoring compliance on actions to address 
impediments, and seeking remedies from HUD.317 Similarly, the 
Transportation Equity Network—a coalition of state and locally based non-
governmental organizations—instructs its members on the regulatory 
requirements and provides examples of effective litigation, administrative 
advocacy, and organizing strategies.318 
This emerging advocacy builds on instances of “hard” enforcement of 
equality directives by administrative agencies and courts. The NLIHC 
encourages state and local groups to take the Westchester case to their 
jurisdictions and reminds them of the court’s holding that the “AFFH 
certification was not a mere boilerplate formality, but rather was a 
substantive requirement . . . .”319 Similarly, transportation advocates 
highlight the successes of litigation and administrative complaints such as 
the BART case.320 This new advocacy involves providing technical 
assistance, shaming noncompliant states and localities, prodding and 
advocacy, and participating in the impact assessments and other tools of 
equality directives. One might call this work private implementation of 
equality directives. The private implementer builds on the gains of the 
private attorney general, but is not constrained by adjudicative advocacy. 
The work to implement equality directives has the potential to engage 
a broader set of groups than traditional adjudicative civil rights 
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enforcement. As the housing and transportation examples show, this 
advocacy connects groups that have traditionally focused on rights 
enforcement with those who engage in non-litigation advocacy and 
community organizing. These efforts also bring “rights” groups—who 
operate in an antidiscrimination frame—together with groups concerned 
with poverty alleviation, community revitalization, and environmental 
reform. In that vein, private implementation efforts of equality directives 
respond to the critique that civil rights lawyering is too centered on formal 
rights that benefit the middle class and insufficiently focused on the 
structural problems of poverty and exclusion.321 
One must acknowledge that even with strong advocacy and oversight 
efforts, some states and localities may not adopt or implement a robust 
regime of equality directives. Grantees might undertake only half-hearted 
efforts, even in the face of federal oversight or advocacy by private actors. 
This will be true in any regime that depends in large part on willing 
government partners.322 Evidence from the structural reform literature 
shows that these constraints exist even in regimes that depend primarily on 
judicial enforcement: They, too, require government cooperation for 
implementation of court-ordered remedies.323 Equality directives provide a 
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new infrastructure for civil rights, one that now seeks to promote structural 
equality and inclusion. And equality directives provide a platform from 
which to leverage existing litigation efforts and connect civil rights lawyers 
with community groups already engaging in advocacy and community 
mobilization. If the success of civil rights and inclusionary goals depends 
not just on courts but on broader forms of political and social 
mobilization,324 then equality directives both depend on and enhance these 
forms of mobilization. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article highlights equality directives, a form of regulation 
excluded from standard narratives of public and private enforcement in 
civil rights. Proactive requirements that state actors promote equality and 
inclusion have long been embedded in key civil rights statutes. However, a 
more robust regulatory regime has emerged in recent years. In some cases, 
it emerged out of the ashes of Sandoval’s weakening of the private attorney 
general function. 
Many of these equality directives are new. Future academic studies 
might examine: (1) how these directives continue to be internalized at the 
federal level in the “permanent government”325 of agencies; (2) how they 
are implemented at the state and local levels; and (3) their potential utility 
in areas outside of transportation and housing, such as criminal justice or 
public health. Subsequent examinations should also consider the 
relationship between equality directives and a broader trend of requiring 
racial impact assessments of government policies: Several states have 
recently adopted legislation requiring that state legislatures and agencies 
evaluate the racial impact of pending legislation and regulations and 
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consider race-neutral alternatives.326 
American equality directives also raise questions for future 
exploration by scholars of comparative antidiscrimination law and of 
American political development. For example, one might examine how the 
development and implementation of American equality directives compares 
to those in Europe and the United Kingdom. This line of inquiry might be 
particularly interesting given the fragmentation of the American 
governance structure, the relative electoral and interest group power of 
minority groups in America, and America’s long-standing emphasis on 
rights. 
For civil rights advocates and commentators interested in promoting 
social equity and inclusion, this Article aims to direct attention to the 
potential that lies in equality directives. An emphasis on individualized 
harm, antidiscrimination, and the private sphere is inadequate to the task of 
promoting equality and inclusion today. Equality directives supplement the 
antidiscrimination frame because they are attuned to the structural 
dimensions of inequality. They extend beyond bias to address the state’s 
contribution to contemporary inequality, as well as the state’s capacity to 
promote inclusion. To fully unleash the capacity of equality directives 
requires building on promising initiatives that are beginning to alter the 
nature of contemporary civil rights advocacy. These initiatives are moving 
beyond the conception of the civil rights advocate as a private attorney 
general and using a range of advocacy tools to expand, implement, and 
leverage these directives at the federal, state, and local levels. 
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